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ABSTRACT 
The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer 
relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship 
be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission 
of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both 
statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to 
open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know 
one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to 
prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together 
must know each other. 
The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly 
referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due 
Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to 
South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer 
standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. 
A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 
2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the 
identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification 
and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 
2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes 
recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be 
addressed. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION, SCOPE, STRUCTURE AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
1.1. Introduction 
Section 1 of the Banks Act1 defines the core business of a bank to include the 
acceptance of deposits from members of the public.2 The business of banking is not 
conducted in a regulatory vacuum; it is highly regulated.3 It has been posited that it is 
a basic requirement for any stable and secure payment system to operate within a 
defined legal framework setting out the rights and obligations of each party involved.4  
The law pertaining to the supervision of banks and other financial intermediaries has 
recently grown into a discipline worthy of study in its own right.5 This dissertation 
seeks to contribute to the discourse on the topic of bank supervision by examining 
the rights and obligations of a bank when opening a bank account. 
                                                 
1 Act 94 of 1990 (as amended). 
2 The characteristics of banking business were discussed by Lord Denning M.R. in United 
Dominions Trust v Kirkwood [1966] 2 Q.B. 431 at 447, where it was held that: 
        Bankers (i) accept money from, and collect cheques for, their customers and place them to  
their credit; (ii) honour cheques or orders drawn on them by their customers when presented 
for payment and debit their customers accordingly, and (iii) keep current accounts in which the 
credits and debits are entered. 
3 Bank regulation is geared towards thwarting fraud and seeks to set standards in the market 
(see Croall 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 45). The regulation of banks and how they 
conduct their business involves cooperative compliance strategies including persuasion, 
advice and education. This is in direct contrast to a ‘policing’ regime, which would emphasise 
the arrest and prosecution of ‘offenders’ (see Croall 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 46). 
4 Lawack 2013 Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 317. 
5 Penn and Wadsley The Law Relating to Domestic Banking 3. 
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The bank is able to carry out its core business of deposit taking only by opening and 
maintaining bank accounts for members of the public.6 In opening accounts, there 
are several requirements that banks must satisfy, such as ensuring that the 
customer’s identity has been satisfactorily established and verified.7 Over and above 
satisfying such requirements when opening an account, the bank also has to be alert 
to the ever present danger that after it has been opened, the account may be used 
for fraudulent purposes.8 
Financial crime remains a fundamental problem for banks in South Africa and other 
financial institutions at both the national and the international levels.9 Minimum 
standards and guidelines have been set by the courts and statutory law to confront 
the scourge of such crime.10 The minimum standards also serve as a guide for the 
banks in their daily business of deposit taking and the disbursement of depositors’ 
funds. Over and above being useful guides, the minimum standards serve as a 
measure of internal control.  
A lack of proper internal controls increases the likelihood of fraud.11  However, as will 
be seen in this dissertation, the set standards have proven not to be a panacea to 
financial crime. That notwithstanding, the consumer, and indeed the provider of bank 
services, can take comfort in the knowledge that the common law and statutory law 
provide some sort of a double safety net against fraudsters. However, it is to be 
expected that from time to time a fraudster will slip through the net and infiltrate the 
                                                 
 6 Penn and Wadsley The Law Relating to Domestic Banking 97. The bank-customer 
relationship commences when an account is opened for a customer. 
7 It may constitute negligence for the bank to fail to take certain steps before opening an        
account (Malan and Pretorius 1994 6 SA Merc LJ 218). 
8 Pretorius 2000 SA Merc LJ 359. 
9    Norton and Walker Banks: Fraud and Crime 89.  
10 See note 12 and 18 below. 
11 Arora and Khanna 2009 International Journal of Business Science and Applied Management 
2 (hereinafter Arora and Khanna (2009)). 
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banking system. The eventuality of such infiltration can never be totally eliminated 
either by enacting specific legislation or by the pronouncement of a punitive 
judgment by the court. 
1.2. The Bank’s Statutory Duties 
The minimum standards and guidelines in the opening of bank accounts are found in 
the common law and statutory law. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act12 is the 
flagship statute in the fight against bank fraud and acts as the first layer of defence in 
the fight against bank account fraud.13 
FICA prescribes the bank’s rights and obligations when opening a bank account.14 
According to its preamble, FICA was enacted to establish the Financial Intelligence 
Centre (FIC) and a Money Laundering Advisory Council (MLAC) to combat money 
laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities. Quite 
significantly for this dissertation, FICA imposes certain duties on institutions and 
other persons to prevent money laundering for the purposes of financing terrorist and 
related activities. The various institutions referred to in the preamble to FICA include 
banks. This dissertation focuses on the duties imposed upon banks when opening 
bank accounts. 
 
In the daily operations of banks in South Africa, specifically when they open bank 
accounts for customers, there is a certain level of care that is expected of the bank 
and its staff. These expectations are expressly stated in FICA. Section 21(1) (a) of 
FICA imposes on a bank the responsibility of establishing and verifying the identity of 
                                                 
12 Act 38 of 2001 (hereinafter FICA). 
 
13 See Van Jaarsveld 2002 Juta’s Bus. L 200, where it is stated that FICA is the main weapon 
used against money laundering. Bank fraud can take various forms. For instance, cheque 
fraud, deposit account fraud, purchase bill fraud, hypothecation fraud, loan fraud, foreign 
exchange and inter branch account fraud. Fraudsters usually capitalise on the failure of the 
bank staff to follow the laid down procedures in opening bank accounts (see Arora and 
Khanna (2009) 3). 
14 De Koker 2004 J. S. Afr. L. 717. 
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its customers. This dissertation focuses on the two-step approach of establishing 
and verifying the identity of a customer. In terms of FICA, a bank is prohibited from 
establishing a ‘business relationship’ with a customer before that customer’s identity 
has been established and verified. 
1.3. The Bank’s Rights and Obligations - the Common Law Perspective 
The second layer of the double-layered net used in the fight against bank account 
fraud is the common law which, just like FICA, binds banks to undertake certain 
procedural steps before they open a bank account for prospective customers.15 The 
courts have taken the first step in recognising the two-step approach referred to 
above.16 A fraudster’s preferred modus operandi is identity theft.17 
Being alive to the perils of identity fraud, the court held in KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v 
Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd18  that: 
                                                 
15 Brodkin Opening Accounts: A Bank’s Obligations and Rights 2. 
16 However, it must be noted that the courts have been intransigent in recognising the liability of 
a collecting bank to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque. In fact, the courts have ruled 
over a period of time that a collecting bank cannot be held liable (see Kidd 1993 S. African 
L.J. 1 and Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1928 WLD 251 (hereinafter 
the Yorkshire Insurance case)). The decision in the Yorkshire Insurance case was followed in 
Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (3) SA 188 (W). The courts’ 
intransigence on the matter notwithstanding, academic writers have always advocated for the 
recognition of a collecting bank’s liability to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque (see for 
instance Malan 1978 De Jure 326 and Malan and Pretorius 1991 THRHR 705). The 
recognition of liability for pure economic loss in Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika 
Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) served as a catalyst for the academics’ support for the recognition of 
a collecting bank’s liability to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque (see Kidd 1993 S. 
African L.J. 2). 
17 The crime of identity theft is usually committed by stealing another person’s identifying 
information and committing fraud using that information (see Sabol 1999 Loyola Consumer 
Law Review 166). A bank that fails to properly screen and verify the identity of its prospective 
clients leaves the door wide open for criminals to access the banking system (see Sabol 1999 
Loyola Consumer Law Review 166). 
18 1995 (1) SA 377 (D) 395I-396B (hereinafter the KwaMashu case). The cases in point are 
legion. See for instance Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd 2002 (1) SA 90 (SCA) 
302D-E (hereinafter the Columbus Joint Venture case) and Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v 
First National Bank of SA Ltd 2001 (3) SA 132 (W) 147B-C (hereinafter the Energy 
Measurements case). 
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I think it could be expected of a reasonable banker to not only satisfy himself of the identity of 
a new client but also gather sufficient information regarding such client to enable him to 
establish whether the person is the person or entity which he, she or it purports to be. 
The recognition of a bank’s established rights and obligations when opening a bank 
account is neither a new phenomenon nor unique to South Africa. The existence of 
established practice was recognised as far back as 1933 by Lord Wright19 and also 
in the case of Marfani & CO. Ltd v Midland Bank, Ltd,20 where it was held by Diplock 
L.J that ‘[w]hat facts ought to be known to the banker, i.e. what enquiries he should 
make must depend on current banking practice, and change as that practice 
changes’.  
It follows that the common law, as articulated in the KwaMashu case and statutory 
law in the form of FICA prescribe certain procedural steps that a bank has to observe 
before establishing a business relationship with a customer. 
1.4. The International Approach   
On an international plane, several efforts have been made to develop clear ‘Know 
Your Customer’ (KYC) rules. The two most prominent international organisations 
which have devoted their energy to the development of the KYC rules are the 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
19 In Lloyds Bank Ltd v E.B Savory & Co [1933] AC 201 at 231 it was held that ‘[I]t is now 
recognised to be  the usual practice not to open an account for a customer without obtaining a 
reference and without enquiring as to the customer’s standing’. In Ladbroke & Co v Todd 
[1914] 30 TLR 433, the court recognised the practice of bankers to satisfy themselves of the 
identity of a prospective customer. 
 
20 [1968] 2 All E.R. 573 (CA) 579D (hereinafter the Marfani case). 
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Financial Action Task Force21 (FATF) and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Regulations and Supervisory Practices.22 The Core Principles for Banking 
Supervision23 published by the Basel Committee24 in 1997 emphasise the 
importance of KYC banking rules as an integral part of a wider strategy to deny 
criminals access to the banking system.25 The KYC rules developed by the Basel 
Committee are premised on the need for the banking industry to fend off risky 
clients.26 KYC is the epitome of housekeeping rules in any bank. It is meant to 
ensure that only desirable elements are allowed to enter the realm of banking. 
                                                 
21 The FATF was established with the aim of intensifying the fight against money laundering and 
its mandate has since been increased to include the fight against terrorist financing. The 
FATF is further mandated to develop responses to proliferation financing and vulnerabilities in 
new technologies which could bring about turmoil in the financial systems across the world 
(Gathii http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam//migrated//pdf.gathii.authcheckdam.pdf (date 
of use: 11 October 2013)). The need to launder money has been labelled the Achilles’ heel of   
organised crime as it forces criminals to co-operate with or seek assistance from institutions in 
the legal economy (see Stessens Money Laundering A New International Law Enforcement 
Model 12-13). The form of assistance that money launderers seek from the legal economy is 
usually in the form of opening bank accounts. 
22 Hereinafter the Basel Committee. 
23 Basel Committee http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm (date of use: 12 July 2013) (hereinafter 
the Core Principles). 
24 The Basel Committee is an organization formed by the world’s most influential capitalist 
countries to provide a forum for the discussion of international banking issues and to help 
guide their respective banking regulatory systems (Mulligan 1998 Fordham International Law 
Journal 2353 (hereinafter Mulligan)). The Basel Committee operates under the administrative 
auspices of the Bank for International Settlements in Basel, Switzerland. Its membership is 
made up of the G10 countries. The Committee's members come from Belgium, Canada, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States of America (available at www.bis.org.(date of use:5 
November 2012)). For a history of the Basel Committee see Goodhart The Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision: A History of The Early Years 1-9 (hereinafter Goodhart The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision). 
25 The Core Principles were revised in 2006 and 2012. The 2012 revision was prompted by the 
significant transformation of the global financial markets and the intention was to maintain, in 
the face of a changing environment, the relevance of the Core Principles in bank supervision 
(available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf (date of use: 8 October 2013)). 
26 Aiolfi and Pieth 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 360. 
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The efforts of the FATF in developing the KYC rules are encapsulated in the Forty 
Recommendations that the FATF published in 1990, and subsequent amendments. 
To achieve the objectives of the Forty Recommendations, the FATF ‘employs peer 
pressure and potentially a graduated set of sanctions to review and influence the 
policies of its members and those of non-members’.27 The FATF strives for a greater 
harmonisation of laws by applying the same standard to all countries, rich or poor, 
developed or developing. It is one of the conditions of admission to membership of 
the FATF that a country must have in place mandatory KYC provisions.28 
The KYC rules developed by the international community have been incorporated 
into South African law through the enactment of FICA.29 The central purpose of KYC 
is to determine the true identity of customers seeking to employ the bank’s 
services.30 However, it has been argued by Professor De Koker31 that KYC is narrow 
in its application in that it is a procedure which is aimed only at gathering sufficient 
information about a customer to compile a profile of the customer.32 Contrasted with 
                                                 
27 Simmons http://scholar.harvard.edu/bsimmons/files/MoneyLaundering.pdf (date of use: 11 
October 2013). The establishment of the KYC regime through the enactment of FICA has 
rendered the process of opening an account difficult. 
28 Jackson http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21904.pdf (date of use: 11 October 2013) 
(hereinafter Jackson (2012)). The other requirements for admission to the FATF are that the 
country must: be fully committed at the political level to implementing the Forty 
Recommendations within a reasonable time frame (three years) and to undergoing annual 
self-assessment exercises and two rounds of mutual evaluations; be a full and active member 
of the relevant FATF-style regional body; be a strategically important country; and have 
already made the laundering of the proceeds of drug trafficking and other serious crimes a 
criminal offence (Jackson (2012)). 
29 The adoption of FICA followed legislative efforts by South Africa to provide for the 
criminalisation and confiscation of the proceeds of money laundering. This legislative strategy 
did not yield much fruit and a change of tack was called for. It was then decided that 
administrative measures in the fight against money laundering must be introduced. The 
administrative measures had to include a KYC regime. Section 21 of FICA is the embodiment 
of the said administrative measures (see Njotini 2010 Obiter 565). 
30 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 209. 
 
31 De Koker 2006 Journal of Financial Crime 28 (hereinafter De Koker (2006)). 
 
32 The International Organisation of Securities Commission http://www.iosco.org (date of use: 16 
May 2012). 
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KYC is Customer Due Diligence (CDD), the purview of which is much broader than 
just collecting information to compile a profile of the customer.33 The purported 
distinctions between the two concepts notwithstanding, the terms KYC and CDD will 
be used interchangeably in this dissertation. 
1.5. The Liability of a Collecting Bank 
That a bank that collects payment on a stolen or lost cheque can be held liable in 
delict to the true owner of the cheque is well settled.34 A collecting bank that opens a 
bank account without satisfactorily establishing and verifying the identity of its 
customer and pays the proceeds of a cheque, when s/he is not entitled thereto, into 
the bank account of that customer, can be held delictually liable to the victim of the 
loss. The recognition of the liability of a collecting banker’s liability to the owner of a 
lost or stolen cheque has not been without controversy.35  
The procedural steps of identification and verification that a bank has to take before 
an account is opened for anyone are meant to protect the banking system from 
lawsuits by victims of crime on the one hand and on the other to protect account 
holders against criminal elements. For the bank to be held liable, all the elements of 
aquillian liability must be present, i.e. 1) a wrongful act or omission, 2) a fault, 3) 
causation and 4) loss.36 
                                                 
33 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 209. CDD has been 
defined as a process whereby information is gathered to ensure that a bank has taken 
reasonable care and reasonable steps to establish and verify the identity of a prospective 
customer. Doing due diligence entails much more than simply verifying the identity of a 
prospective customer. It is an open-ended process and it is impossible to tell what knowing 
one’s customer will lead to (see Maurer 2005 Cultural Anthropology 491). 
34 Van der Linde 1995 Juta's Bus. L. 10. 
35 Malan, Pretorius and du Toit  Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes 
396 (hereinafter Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes). 
36 Boberg The Law of Delict 25. 
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This dissertation will elaborate on the extent of the bank’s rights and obligations 
when opening a bank account for a client; the level of care that must be employed; 
and the liability of the bank, if any, in the event that the bank, through its employees, 
fails to uphold the established KYC standards.  
1.6. Objective and Research Questions of the Dissertation 
The sole objective of this dissertation is to analyse the obligations of a bank when 
opening a bank account. This is done by delving into both the common law and 
statutory law with specific reference to the South African context as influenced by 
documents released by international organisations dealing with the same subject 
matter and foreign courts faced with the same problems. 
The paramount questions in conducting this dissertation are:  
(a) What are the duties of the bank when opening an account? 
(b) What information is it obliged to ask for at the very minimum? 
(c) Is there a limit to the kind of information that the bank can demand before it 
opens a bank account?  
(d) If the prospective client refuses to provide the said minimum information, does 
the bank retain discretion to open an account for that customer 
notwithstanding his/her unwillingness or refusal to provide the requisite 
information? 
It is an elementary rule of law that every right is accompanied by an obligation. What 
are the bank’s obligations when opening a bank account? It is axiomatic that where 
rights and obligations are imposed and there is failure to comply with those rights 
and obligations, liability will follow such failure as day follows night. In the event that 
a bank fails to comply with its rights and obligations, what type of liability, if any, does 
it expose itself to? The foregoing questions will be answered in this dissertation. 
1.7. Methodology 
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This dissertation will be based on an analysis of the common law and statutory 
duties and obligations of banks in South Africa when opening an account for 
customers. Relevant primary and secondary resources will be consulted. Primary 
sources include legislation and law reports. Secondary sources include books, 
journal articles and the internet. 
1.8. Overview of the Chapters  
Chapter one is an introduction and sets out the content and structure of the 
dissertation. 
Chapter two discusses the duties and obligations of banks on an international plane 
with specific emphasis on the KYC principle.  
Chapter three will consider the duties and obligations of banks in South Africa as 
stipulated in FICA. Also discussed in this chapter will be the adoption of the KYC 
principle into FICA. 
Chapter four will be based on an illustration of the application and practice of the 
KYC provisions stipulated in FICA by the South African courts.  
A summary of all the chapters and recommendations on how banks in South Africa 
can ensure that they fulfil their statutory and common law obligations when opening 
accounts for customers in the best interest of customers will be contained in Chapter 
five, which will conclude the dissertation. 
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CHAPTER 2 
INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION FOR BANKS 
2.1. Introduction  
There is an international obligation and expectation on banks to conduct themselves 
and their business of deposit taking in a certain way. The standards which the banks 
have to uphold require that they identify and verify the identities of their clients.37  
This obligation has been adopted in the banking laws of several countries38 and as 
such has become the acceptable general practice. 
The uniform standard and obligation is that all banks must know their customers 
before conducting any business with them.39 This is known as the KYC standards. In 
1988 the Basel Committee40 adopted a Statement of Principles which required banks 
to verify and establish the true identity of their clients. The banks were thus required 
                                                 
37 De Koker (2006) 26. 
38 The Forty Recommendations are regarded as the model rules in the fight against money 
laundering and have been translated into binding regional legislation, i.e. the Council Directive 
of the European Communities of 10 June 1991 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial 
System for the Purpose of Money laundering (91/308/EEC) (Pieth 1998 European Journal of 
Crime Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 160). 
39 Filotto and Masciandro 2001 Journal of Money Laundering Control 140. The aims of KYC are 
quite simple and laudable; to know one’s customer and prevent criminals from accessing the 
bank’s service (see De Koker (2006) 27). 
40 Goodhart The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 4. The Basel Committee is a 
supranational organisation committed to creating non-binding supervisory principles and 
standards (see Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 213). The 
Basel Committee was set up in 1975 by the central bank governors of the G-10 countries 
following some disruptions in the financial markets. South Africa is a member of the Basel 
Committee and is represented by the South African Reserve Bank (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision: A Brief History of the Basel Committee (available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf (date of use: 21 September 2014)) 
 
 12 
 
to conform to KYC standards. The principles, as the name suggests, do not have a 
binding effect on the participating countries.41  
Amongst a plethora of documents that the Basel Committee has issued, four of them 
are pertinent to this dissertation as they relate to the KYC standards and CDD.42 The 
said four documents issued by the Basel Committee are (1) the Basel Statement of 
Principles43 in 1988, (2) the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision44 in 
1999, (3) Customer Due Diligence for Banks in 2001, and (4) the General Guide to 
Account Opening and Client Identification in 2003.  
2.2. KYC in Perspective 
2.2.1. The Basel Statement of Principles and KYC standards  
In 1988 The Basel Committee issued a document entitled the Prevention of Criminal 
Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, which stated that: 
This Statement of Principles is intended to outline some basic policies and procedures that 
banks’ managements should ensure are in place within their institutions with a view to 
assisting in the suppression of money-laundering through the banking system, national and 
international. The Statement thus sets out to reinforce existing best practices among banks 
and, specifically, to encourage vigilance against criminal use of the payments system, 
implementation by banks of effective preventive safeguards and cooperation with law 
enforcement agencies.45 
                                                 
 41 ‘The Committee does not possess any formal supranational supervisory authority, and its 
conclusions do not and were never intended to have legal force. Rather, it formulates broad 
supervisory standards and guidelines and recommends statements of best practice in the 
expectation that individual countries will take steps to implement them’ (available at 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (date of use: 11 October 2011)). 
 
42 Goodhart The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 286. 
43 Hereinafter the Statement. 
44 Hereinafter Core Principles. 
45 Paragraph 1 of the Statement. 
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In issuing the Statement, the Basel Committee warned that banks may be   
intentionally or unintentionally employed by criminals as conduits for money obtained 
through unlawful means.46 The Basel Committee was wary of banks being 
associated with criminals as this has the potential to erode public confidence in the 
banking system.47 The Basel Committee therefore endeavoured to outlaw 
anonymous bank accounts and took as a point of departure the interest that a bank 
has in maintaining a positive image.48 
The Statement requires a bank to have appropriate policies and processes in place, 
which include strict KYC rules that promote high ethical and professional standards 
in the financial sector. The banks are warned to be vigilant against criminal use of 
the payment system. The aim of the Statement is to strengthen or improve measures 
that had already been put in place by the banking sector to thwart the criminal use of 
the payment system. The Statement places banks at centre stage in the fight against 
money laundering.49 
The Basel Committee recognised that the main function of bank supervision was to 
maintain overall financial stability of the banks rather than to ensure that individual 
transactions conducted by bank customers are lawful.50 The members of the 
                                                 
46 As a prelude to the purpose of the Statement, Paragraph 1 of the Preamble says that: 
 
Banks and other financial institutions may be unwittingly used as intermediaries for the transfer 
or deposit of funds derived from criminal activity. Criminals and their associates use the 
financial system to make payments and transfers of funds from one account to another; to hide 
the source and beneficial ownership of money; and to provide storage for bank-notes through a 
safe-deposit facility’ (see Kutubi 2011 World Journal of Social Sciences 38). 
 
47 Aiolfi and Pieth 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 360. 
 
48 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 214. 
49 Prior to the release of the Statement, the efforts that were undertaken with the objective of        
preventing the banking system from being used in this way were largely undertaken by 
judicial and regulatory agencies at national level (see Paragraph 2 of the Statement). 
50 Paragraph 3 of the Statement. 
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Committee were in accord that bank supervisors cannot afford to remain passive 
while criminals employ banks for their nefarious ends.51 
The life and soul of a bank is the confidence that the public has in it.52 Once that 
confidence is eroded, the collapse of that bank will follow as a matter of course.53 
Banks were also warned of the consequences of their association with criminals54 
and the collapse of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) is a 
classical case in point. The bank had created an intricate web of companies which 
was able to evade regulation or supervision by any authority.55 
The Statement56 goes on to identify customer identification as an important tool in 
ensuring that the financial system is not employed as a conduit for illegally derived 
funds. Banks are urged to establish the ‘true identity’, not just any identity, of persons 
seeking to conduct business with them. Banks are implored to introduce effective 
                                                 
51 Available at http://www.bis.org (date of use: 11 October 2011). 
 
52 Di Lorenzo 1986 American University Law Review 647. Confidence is the pre-condition of the 
business of banking (Wood Governing Global Banking: The Basel Committee and the Politics 
of Financial Globalisation 8). 
53 Paragraph 4 of the Statement is alive to this fact. In dealing with this conundrum, the 
Committee urged bank supervisors to ‘encourage ethical standards of professional conduct 
among banks and other financial institutions’ (see Paragraph 4 of the Statement). 
54 Of particular importance is the loss that a bank may suffer as a result of ‘negligence in 
screening undesirable customers’. The focus of this dissertation is the ‘screening of 
customers’ and the consequences of failure to undertake the same by a bank before a 
business relationship is established. 
 
55 The BCCI had set up: 
 
An elaborate corporate spider-web with BCCI’s founder, Agha Hasan Abedi and his assistant, 
Swaleh Naqvi, in the middle was an essential component of its spectacular growth and a 
guarantee of its eventual collapse. The structure was conceived by Agha Hasan Abedi and 
managed by Swaleh Naqvi for the specific purpose of evading regulation or control by 
governments. It functioned to frustrate the full understanding of BCCI’s operations by anyone. 
(Brown and Kerry www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci/ (date of use: 19 July 2013)). 
 
56 At Paragraph II. 
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procedures for identifying new clients.57 Quite significantly, banks were urged to 
adopt policies that are consistent with the Statement.58 
2.2.2. KYC through the Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision 
The Basel Committee met once again in 1997 and came up with the Core Principles 
for Effective Banking Supervision (the Core Principles).59 The Committee recognised 
that weakness in the banking system of a country can threaten financial stability both 
within that country and internationally.60 
The Core Principles were endorsed by the central bank governors of the Group of 
Ten (G-10).61  The Core Principles identify twenty-five basic principles that are a pre-
condition for an effective supervisory system.62 Only Principle number 15 will be 
discussed in this dissertation. 
                                                 
57 Kutubi 2011 World Journal of Social Sciences 38. 
58 The Statement was never intended to be just a decorative piece of paper:  
 
All banks should formally adopt policies consistent with the principles set out in this Statement 
and should ensure that all members of their staff concerned, wherever located, are informed of 
the bank’s policy in this regard. Attention should be given to staff training in matters covered by 
the Statement. To promote adherence to these principles, banks should implement specific 
procedures for customer identification and for retaining internal records of transactions (see 
Paragraph V of the Statement). 
 
59 A full list of the Core Principles is available at www.bis.org (date of use: 16 July 2012). The 
Principles were revised twice, in 2006 and 2012, and the number of the Core Principles has 
since increased from 25 to 29 (see http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf) (date of use: 19 
August 2014)). 
 
60 Paragraph 1 of the Core Principles. 
 
61 Paragraph 2 of the Core Principles. The members of the G-10 are drawn from the central 
banks of Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (see Dobson and 
Hufbauer World Capital Markets-Challenge to the G-10 2). 
 
62 Paragraph 4 of the Core Principles. The basic Principles are listed as: Preconditions for 
effective banking supervision - Principle 1, Licensing and structure - Principles 2 to 5, 
Prudential regulations and requirements - Principles 6 to 15, Methods of ongoing banking 
supervision - Principles 16 to 20, Information requirements - Principle 21, Formal powers of 
supervisors - Principle 22, and Cross-border banking - Principles 23 to 25. 
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Principle number 15 revisits and re-emphasises the importance of the KYC standard, 
although in a somewhat roundabout way.63 The Principle imposes on bank 
supervisors a responsibility to ensure that banks have measures in place, which 
include strict KYC rules, that will deny criminals access to the bank’s facilities.  
The Core Principles reiterate the warning made earlier in the Statement that public 
confidence in banks can be undermined and reputations damaged as a result of their 
association with criminals. Supervisors are also urged to encourage the adoption of 
those recommendations of the FATF that apply to financial institutions. The 
recommendations relevant to this dissertation relate to customer identification.64  
2.2.3. KYC and the Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001)  
The Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001)65 is the most comprehensive document 
pertaining to the KYC standards to be released by the Basel Committee.66 The 
document, by way of introduction,67 boldly and correctly states that belief in the 
significance of knowing one’s customer is gaining traction around the world.68 
Knowing one’s customer is part of the internal controls that a bank has to put in 
place in order to save itself from reputational, legal,69  and operational risks. The 
                                                 
63 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 217. 
 
64 See chapter 2.4 below. 
65 Hereinafter CDD for Banks (2001). 
66 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 6, emphasises that ‘[t]his paper reinforces the principles 
established in earlier Committee papers by providing more precise guidance on the essential 
elements of KYC standards and their implementation’. 
 
67 At Paragraph 1. 
68 The document is available at www.bis.org (date of use: 11 September 2012). 
 
69 This is the risk, among the four risks, that will form an important part of this dissertation.  It is 
stated at Paragraph 13 of CDD for Banks (2001) that ‘Banks will be unable to protect 
themselves effectively from such legal risks if they do not engage in due diligence in 
identifying their customers and understanding their business’. 
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CDD for Banks (2001) was released to address the deficiencies that were identified 
in the KYC policies of most countries.70 
The KYC standards are mostly associated with the fight against money laundering, 
which is essentially the province of the FATF.71 The CDD for Banks (2001), from its 
wider prudential perspective, identifies four fundamental elements it believes to be 
the crux of a sound KYC programme.72 Of the four elements only two, customer 
acceptance policy and customer identification, will be scrutinised in this dissertation.  
2.2.4. Customer Acceptance Policy  
Banks are implored to develop clear customer acceptance policies and 
procedures.73 The policies and procedures must describe the type of customers that 
pose a higher than average risk to the bank. This is in recognition of the fact that 
different risks attach to different potential clients.74 
Clients who occupy the highest position on the risk scale must be subjected to the 
most rigorous due diligence. The reverse must also hold: if a client poses minimal 
risk, s/he must be subjected to the most basic due diligence. However, it is submitted 
that banks are duty bound not to structure their customer acceptance policies in such 
a way that the general public is denied access to the banking system or a perception 
is created that a certain category of clients is viewed with suspicion. 
2.2.5. Customer Identification  
                                                 
70   CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 2.  
  
71 In an endeavor to allay any suspicions that it is trying to usurp the functions of the FATF, 
Paragraph 3 of CDD for Banks (2001) unequivocally states that ‘[i]t is not the Committee’s 
intention to duplicate the efforts of the FATF’. 
 
72 The four essential elements are (1) customer acceptance policy, (2) customer identification, 
(3) on-going monitoring of high risk accounts and (4) risk management (see CDD for Banks 
(2001), Paragraph 19). 
 
73 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 20. 
 
74 In preparing the said policies, regard must be had to the customer’s profile. (see CDD for 
Banks (2001)). 
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A bank has to know the identity of the person with whom it seeks to do business. 
Identifying a customer is an indispensable part of KYC.75 A bank is barred from 
entering into any business relationship with a customer before the identity of that 
customer is satisfactorily established.76 Customers must identify themselves with 
documents that are difficult to obtain illicitly and to counterfeit.77 
Quite obviously, the customer must be identified at the outset of the relationship.78 
All information necessary to establish the identity of a client to the satisfaction of the 
bank must be gathered and the intended nature of the business relationship must be 
ascertained.79 If problems of identity arise during the relationship, the account must 
be closed.80 Anonymous accounts or accounts operated under fictitious names 
should not be opened or maintained.81 
2.3. KYC and Account Opening for Clients  
The General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification82 document was 
developed by the Working Group on Cross Border Banking of the Basel Committee 
                                                 
75 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 21 defines a customer as follows: ‘[t]he person or entity that 
maintains an account with the bank or those on whose behalf an account is maintained (i.e. 
beneficial owners)’. 
 
76 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 22. It is also incumbent upon banks to establish a 
systematic procedure for identifying new customers. 
 
77 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 23. However, in the light of the identity fraud prevailing in 
South Africa, it is doubtful that any document can be classified as ‘difficult to obtain illicitly and 
counterfeit’. 
 
78 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 24. 
 
79 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 27. 
80 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 28. 
 
81 CDD for Banks (2001) Paragraph 30. 
 
82 The General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification (2003) (available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85annex.htm (date of use: 20 May 2012)) expanded on the 
general principles espoused in CDD for Banks (2001) by defining what a bank needs to know 
about a client in order to build a risk profile of the client before s/he can be admitted as a 
client (see Hernandez-Coss, Isern and Porteous AML/CFT Regulation: Implications for 
Financial Service Providers that Serve Low Income People 14). 
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and it was meant to focus on some of the mechanisms that banks can employ in 
effective customer identification programmes.83 
The Guidelines are divided into two categories. Section A deals with the documents 
that should be collected and verified for natural persons seeking to open accounts, 
while Section B deals with the information that has to be collected and verified as 
regards legal entities.84 
A natural person’s legal name, correct permanent address, contact details 
(telephone number, fax number, and e-mail address), date and place of birth, 
nationality, occupation, public position held and/or name of employer, an official 
personal identification number or other unique identifier contained in an unexpired 
official document (e.g. passport, identification card, residence permit, social security 
records, driving licence) that bears a photograph of the customer, type of account 
and nature of the banking relationship and signature must be obtained.85 
As regards legal entities, the following information must be gathered: name and 
principal place of business of the institution, contact address, including postal 
address, telephone and fax numbers, the tax identification number if available, a 
copy of the certificate of incorporation, memorandum and articles of association of 
the company, the resolution of the board of directors authorising the opening of the 
                                                 
83 Paragraph 2 of CDD for Banks (2001). See also The General Guide to Account Opening 
(2006) (hereinafter the Guidelines (2006)). 
 
84 Paragraph 8 of the Guidelines (2006). 
 
85 Paragraph 10 of the Guidelines (2006). The information gathered must be verified in the 
following manner: 
 
 Confirming the date of birth from an official document (e.g. birth certificate,  passport, identity 
card, social security records); confirming the permanent address (e.g. utility bill, tax 
assessment, bank statement, a letter from a public authority); contacting the customer by 
telephone, by letter or by e-mail to confirm the information supplied after an account has been 
opened (e.g. a disconnected phone, returned mail, or incorrect e-mail address should warrant 
further investigation); confirming the validity of the official documentation provided through 
certification by an authorised person (e.g. embassy official, notary public) (see Paragraph 11 of 
the Guidelines (2006)). 
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bank account, and the nature of the business being undertaken by the company.86 
The information must further be verified by visiting the company premises, obtaining 
prior references, reviewing the company’s audited statements and having the 
submitted documents verified by an independent and reputable firm of attorneys or 
accountants.87 
This brings the history of the KYC rules as seen from the perspective of the Basel 
Committee to a close, and the FATF will be explored next. 
2.4. The Financial Action Task Force 
The FATF88 is an independent inter-governmental body that develops and promotes 
policies to protect the global financial system against money laundering and terrorist 
financing.89 Since its inception in 1989 the FATF has been a front runner in the fight 
                                                 
86 Paragraph 19 of the Guidelines (2006). 
 
87 Paragraph 20 of the Guidelines (2006). 
88 The FATF was created during the 1989 Paris Summit of the G-7 on the initiative of the French 
and British governments. Its stated goal is ‘the development of national and international 
policies to combat money laundering’, www.fatf-gafi.org (date of use: 20 May 2012). By 1990 
the FATF had released its first round of Forty Recommendations, which were expanded in 
1996 and would act as global standards for anti-money laundering (AML) legislation. FATF 
Forty Recommendations on Money Laundering (hereinafter FATF Forty Recommendations) 
(available at www.fatfgafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatfrecommendations) 
(date of use: 12 January 2013)).  The FATF Forty Recommendations were first revised in 
1996 and the second revision was carried out in 2003. On the back of the September 11 
attacks in the United States of America, the FATF adopted 8 further recommendations 
specifically dealing with the financing of terrorism (see chapter 1.4 above). A ninth 
recommendation was added in 2004. These two sets are now commonly referred to as the 
‘FATF 49 Recommendations’ (see De Koker (2006) 30). In 2012, the FATF Forty 
Recommendations were revised to keep abreast with new and emerging threats and to clarify 
and strengthen the existing Recommendations. The revised Recommendations of 2012 have 
been structured in such a way that countries would be able to identify and focus resources on 
high risk situations and to then channel resources towards mitigation of the said high risk 
situation. Countries are also allowed to be flexible in their implementation of the 
Recommendations. The measures aimed at combatting terrorist financing have been 
incorporated in to the 2012 revision of the Recommendations. (available at www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/docu ments/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf) (date of 
use: 30 July 2015)). 
89 FATF http://www.fatfgafi.org//fatf//documents//reports/Global%20Threat%20assessment.html 
(date of use: 7 October 2013) (hereinafter FATF Report (2010)). 
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against the use of the financial system by criminals.90 The FATF is based in Paris, 
France, and it is considered the main international AML standard setter.91 South 
Africa has the privilege of being the only African country to hold membership of the 
FATF.92 
The FATF possesses no traditional or ‘hard’ legal authority and therefore relies on 
political pressure to instigate change in the AML legislation of a country.93 In 1990 
the FATF released its first set of Recommendations, 40 in total, which provide 
standards of money laundering counter-measures to which States can adhere by 
pledging to implement similar legislation within their jurisdictions.94 The original Forty 
Recommendations were revised in 1996 and endorsed by more than 130 
countries.95 In the main, the Forty Recommendations comprise three parts, namely 
legal recommendations explaining what law-making bodies must do to create a legal 
framework to combat money laundering,96 financial regulatory recommendations that 
                                                 
 90 FATF Report (2010) 3 states that the FATF established the Forty Recommendations in 1990 
and has reviewed them from time to time so as to ensure that they remain up to date with 
current threats posed by money launderers and terrorist financiers.  
91 Thelesklaf International Centre for Asset Recovery: Tracing Stolen Assets: A Practitioner’s 
Handbook 63. 
92 FATF http://www.fatf-gafi.org/pages/aboutus/membersandobservers (date of use: 16 May 
2013). 
93 See Shepherd 2009 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 85; Gathii 2010 Journal of the 
Professional Lawyer 200-205.  Even though the Recommendations contributed to the creation 
of a ‘soft’ law regime, the Recommendations had a considerable influence on ‘hard law’ 
regimes within domestic legislations. South Africa implemented the FATF AML standards in 
June 2003 when FICA came into force (see Bester, De Koker and Hawthorne 
www.microfinancegateway.org (date of use: 5 November 2012)). 
94 Mangels http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?nxtres=861&form (date of use: 19 
October 2012) (hereinafter Mangels (2012)). 
95 FATF Forty Recommendations (2003) (incorporating all subsequent amendments until 
October 2004). 
96 Countries are urged to criminalise money laundering as per the  United Nations Convention 
against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 1988 (the Vienna 
Convention) and the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 
2000 (the Palermo Convention) (see FATF Forty Recommendations (2003) 
Recommendations 1-6). 
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outline how countries should regulate their financial systems,97 and international 
cooperation recommendations that clarify how governments should facilitate 
cooperation among one another.98 
In terms of the FATF Forty Recommendations (2003), financial institutions are 
expected to strictly enforce KYC rules.99 Recommendation 5 explicitly states that 
financial institutions should undertake customer due diligence measures, including 
identifying and verifying the identity of their customers when establishing a business 
relationship or carrying out occasional transactions. Customer identification and 
verification, in terms of the Recommendations, must take place before or during the 
business relationship.100 Where the financial institution fails to comply with the 
identification and verification requirement, it must not open the account or it must 
terminate the business relationship.101  
The FATF Recommendations (2003) modernised the relevant part of the Forty 
Recommendations dealing with KYC rules and it is further evident that the FATF 
Recommendations (2003) are strikingly similar to section 21 of FICA. South Africa 
started drawing guidance from the FATF guidelines and principles in 1995 when it 
started developing its own anti money laundering regime.102 
The latest revision to the Forty Recommendations was carried out in 2012 after 
consultation and cooperation with FATF Style Regional Bodies, the International 
                                                 
97 FATF Forty Recommendations (2003), Recommendation 16. 
98 FATF Forty Recommendations (2003), Recommendation 38. 
99 See also Moshi 2007 ISS 3. 
100 FATF Forty Recommendations (2003), Recommendation 5(d). See also De Koker South 
African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 26. 
101 FATF Forty Recommendations (2003), Recommendation 5(d). See also De Koker (2006) 26. 
102 Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion http://www.gpfi.org (date of use: 20 August 2013). 
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Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations.103 The 2012 revision of the 
Forty Recommendations was necessitated by the need to address new and 
emerging threats and the need to clarify and supplement the existing 
Recommendations.104 
2.5. Conclusion  
It is evident from the foregoing discussion that the international community has 
always taken proactive steps in addressing the issue of client identification before 
the establishment of a business relationship. The international community took these 
initiatives in recognition of the fact that the foundation of any functional banking 
system is the confidence that its client have in it. 
The banking public must be assured of the safety of their deposits with banks. The 
said deposits can be safe only if the bank does not admit fraudsters or criminals to 
its fold. For the bank to be able to effectively screen its potential clients, it must have 
in place processes and procedures that are aimed at establishing and verifying the 
identity of its potential customers. The international community has provided 
guidance on customer identification and verification through the publication of 
various comprehensive documents. This occurred before the promulgation of FICA, 
which is modelled on the documents published by the FATF and the Basel 
Committee. 
The only shortcoming with the documents published by the FATF and the Basel 
Committee is that they have only persuasive force and are not binding on member 
states. It is left to the member states to decide if they want to domesticate, through 
legislation, the documents published by the international community. That 
notwithstanding, the influence of the documents published by the international 
                                                 
103 FATF Recommendations http://www.fatf-gafi.org//media/fatf/documents//recommendations// 
pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (date of use: 21 August 2014) (hereinafter FATF 
Recommendations (2012)). 
104 FATF Recommendations (2012). 
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community on the shape and content of South African domestic legislation, FICA, is 
beyond question. 
It is completely impossible for any bank to remain impervious to the ramifications of 
bank account fraud. The KYC regime as developed by the international community 
goes a long way towards helping banks not only in the fight against bank account 
fraud but also, as far as is feasible, in arresting it before it happens. The influence of 
the documents published by the international community on FICA will become 
apparent in the ensuing Chapter.  
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CHAPTER 3 
THE SOUTH AFRICAN BANKING LEGISLATION  
3.1. Introduction 
In 1996 the South African Law Commission105 (SALC) accepted as a starting point 
that a legislative scheme to introduce regulatory measures is an antecedent step in 
the fight against money laundering.106 The SALC made preliminary proposals for a 
regulatory framework to combat money laundering and a proposed Bill107 to embody 
the SALC’s proposals was published together with the said preliminary proposals.108 
The report was submitted to the Minister of Finance, who appointed advisors to 
consider the report and make recommendations on its implementation.109 Several 
proposals were made but the KYC policy was adopted as the most effective and 
potentially instrumental to the success of an anti-money laundering regime.110  
                                                 
105 The SALC was established by the South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973. 
 
106 See Paragraph 1.2 of the South African Law Commission ‘Money Laundering and Related 
Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996). The SALC had acknowledged, still at 
Paragraph 1.2, that the mere criminalisation of money laundering would not solve the problem 
of money laundering. 
 
107 The Money Laundering Control Bill (hereinafter the draft Bill). 
108 SALC ‘Money Laundering and Related Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996) 104 
Paragraph 1.1. 
109 Smit 2001 ISS Monograph 40. 
110 SALC ‘Money Laundering and Related Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996) 
Paragraph 5.2. 
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For a KYC policy to be effectively implemented, the bank must be able to establish 
and verify the identity of its customer.111 The SALC further counseled banks against 
the operation of anonymous accounts, accounts held under pseudonyms or false 
names and accounts held by nominees, as well as transactions done through 
agents, where the beneficial owners or principals are unknown to the bank.112 The 
SALC acknowledged the attendant costs of maintaining and implementing such a 
regulatory regime.113  
As a result of the proposals made by the SALC, a draft Bill on money laundering was 
introduced. Its stated intention was:  
To prevent the manipulation and concealment of proceeds of crime; in this regard to provide 
for duties of identification, record-keeping and reporting of information; the establishment of a 
Financial Intelligence Centre; the establishment of a Money-laundering Policy Board; and for 
incidental matters.114 
The draft Bill was issued mainly for two reasons: to show South Africa’s commitment 
to the fight against money laundering and to establish a financial centre.115 The 
government vacillated on the proposed legislation until it was pressurised by the 
business community to move faster on the legislation.116 It was then, with the added 
                                                 
111 The SALC had proposed that: ‘institutions should be required to obtain proof of a client’s 
identity and to ascertain the identity of all persons with whom transactions are concluded’. 
The manner of obtaining and verifying the client’s identity was left to the Minister, who was to 
prescribe the same by Regulation. For natural persons, the ideal manner of identification is 
either through an identity document or a passport, and a legal person can best identify itself 
with its constitution and a list of the names of its directors, executive officers, chairpersons or 
other persons in control of that legal person (see SALC ‘Money Laundering and Related 
Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996) Paragraphs 5.3- 5.4). 
112 SALC ‘Money Laundering and Related Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996) 
Paragraphs 5.3- 5.4. 
 
113 SALC ‘Money Laundering and Related Matters Project 104 Discussion Paper 64’ (1996) 
Paragraph 9.1. 
114 See the Preamble to the draft Bill. 
 
115 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 583. 
116 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 2-8. 
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pressure from the international community, that the government through the Minister 
of Finance appointed a task team to advise it on the suitability of the draft Bill 
prepared in 1996 by the SALC.117 
As a result of the deliberations of the task team, a Bill known as the Financial 
Intelligence Bill 2001 was formulated and subsequently passed by parliament. It 
came to be known as the Financial Intelligence Centre Act, and was signed into law 
by the former President Mbeki on 28 November 2001.118 
3.2. KYC as seen from the Perspective of FICA 
The stated intention of FICA is quite succinct: 
To establish a Financial Centre and a Money Laundering Advisory Council in order to combat 
money laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities; to impose 
certain duties on institutions and other persons who might be used for money laundering 
purposes and the financing of terrorist and related activities; to amend the Prevention of 
Organised Crime Act, 1998, and the Promotion of Access to Information Act, 2000; and to 
provide for matters connected therewith.119 
FICA is based on three principles, namely: 
                                                 
117 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 2-8. The terms of 
reference for the task team were simply to review the appropriateness of a draft Bill prepared 
in 1996 by the SALC; to consult with representatives of designated institutions which would 
be compelled to implement the Bill’s provisions; and to make recommendations on a 
framework for the effective implementation of such legislation (see Memorandum on the 
Objects of the Financial Intelligence Bill 2001 at 20). See also Van Jaarsveld (2001) 13 SA 
Merc LJ 584. 
 
118 The passing of the Act allowed South Africa to become a member of the FATF in 2003 and 
assume the Presidency of the organization in 2005 (see Mthembu-Salter 2006 ISS 
Monograph Series 26). Its passing further completed South Africa’s legislative framework for 
money laundering control (see Van Jaarsveld 2006 Obiter 241). Different sections of FICA 
had different commencement dates, i.e. sections 1 to 20, 72 to 78 and 80 to 82 commenced 
on the 1st February 2002 (see Proclamation No. 6, Gazette No. 23078 dated the 31st January 
2002). On the other hand, sections 21(1), 22 to 26, 42 to 43, 46(1), 47 to 49, 61 to 62 and 
68(2) commenced on the 30th June 2003 (see Proclamation No. 51, Gazette No. 25151 dated 
27th June 2003). 
 
119 The Preamble to FICA. See also Jones and Schoeman An Introduction to South African 
Banking and Credit Law 36. 
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a) customer identification; 
b) suspicious transaction reporting; and  
c) preservation of the paper trail of transactions through the financial system.120 
Only the principle of customer identification will be discussed as this dissertation is 
focused on the obligations and duties of a bank when opening a bank account. 
3.2.1. Customer Due Diligence through FICA 
The CDD outlines standards and guidelines for banks to follow when conducting 
business with existing and new clients.121 The concept CDD was known as KYC 
before the adoption of the 2003 FATF recommendations.122 Of late, the terms have 
been used interchangeably.123 
This principle is enunciated in section 21 of FICA.124 Section 21 creates obligations 
for accountable institutions125 to take certain steps to establish and verify the identity 
                                                 
120 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of South African Money Laundering Law 474. 
 
121 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of South African Money Laundering Law 219-221. Reference is also 
made to CDD for Banks (2001) paras 2 –30. 
 
122 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-3. 
 
123 De Koker is of the opinion that CDD is slightly wider in scope than KYC, which is aimed at 
obtaining sufficient information about a customer to compile a profile of that customer (see De 
Koker (2006) 26). Unlike KYC, CDD involves additional steps which calculate the risk involved 
in entering into a business relationship with a particular person. 
 
124 The section came into effect on the 30th of June 2003. It reads as follows:  
 
      An accountable institution may not establish a business relationship or conclude a single 
transaction with a client unless the accountable institution has taken the prescribed steps—  
(a) to establish and verify the identity of the client;  
(b) if the client is acting on behalf of another person, to establish and verify 
                                  (i) the identity of that other person; and  
                    (ii) the client’s authority to establish the business relationship or to conclude the single 
transaction on behalf of that other person; and  
  (c) if another person is acting on behalf of the client, to establish and verify  
       (i) the identity of that other person; and  
                      (ii) that other person’s authority to act on behalf of the client. 
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of a customer prior to establishing a business relationship126 or concluding a single 
transaction with that customer.127 As far as this dissertation is concerned, this is the 
most important section of the Act, as it lays down the foundation for other obligations 
created by the Act.128 
The obligations created by section 21 are twofold: 
i) Firstly, the bank is obliged to ascertain the identity of its customer and 
having established his identity; 
ii) The bank has to go to the next level, which is the verification of the identity 
of that customer.  
The two obligations of section 21 are concurrent and both must be complied with at 
the same time. The second obligation, verification, cannot be fulfilled without having 
complied with the first obligation of establishing the identity of the customer. It is 
common sense that that which has not been established can never be verified. Both 
the identification and verification requirements stipulated by FICA are premised on 
best international practice.129 
                                                                                                                                                        
125 Section 1 of FICA defines an accountable institution as a person referred to at Schedule 1 of 
FICA. Amongst a list of persons listed as accountable institutions is a person who carries on 
the ‘business of a bank’ as defined in the Banks Act 94 of 1990.  
126 A business relationship is defined as an arrangement between a client and an accountable 
institution for the purpose of concluding transactions on a regular basis (see section 1 of 
FICA).  
127 The identification and verification procedures are also known as ‘CIV’, Client Identification and 
Verification procedures (see De Koker (2006) 26). 
128 A bank that fails to obtain sufficient knowledge about the identity of a customer and the nature 
of his business would be unable to identify a particular transaction as unusual or suspicious in 
terms of section 29 of the Act. The identification obligation further means that banks have to 
conduct customer profiling, which includes familiarity with the background of the customer, his 
credentials and earning capacity (see Van Jaarsveld Aspects of South African Money 
Laundering Law 480). The other obligations created by FICA are the reporting of suspicious 
transactions (see section 29(1) of FICA) and the record keeping obligation (see section 22(1) 
(a)-(i) of FICA). 
 
129  De Koker 2002 Journal of Money Laundering Control 168. 
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It is axiomatic that a bank will be able to comply with its identification and verification 
obligations only if its employees have been trained to undertake the same. Section 
43 of FICA makes it mandatory for banks to train their employees to comply with the 
Act and the AML rules of the bank. It is a criminal offence to fail to comply with the 
training obligations created by FICA.130  
A bank may not immediately dispose of the information it has collected in relation to 
identifying and verifying the identity of a client. It is duty bound to keep a record of 
that information.131 The bank that collected the identifying and verifying information 
from a client must retain it for a minimum period of 5 years.132 
3.2.2. Customer Identification  
The identification is carried out on three levels.133 The first level is where the bank is 
approached by a customer in person,134 the second is where the bank is approached 
by a person acting on behalf of another,135 and the third is where the bank is 
approached by another person acting on behalf of the customer.136 
On all three levels a bank ‘may not’ establish a business relationship or conclude a 
single transaction without having complied with the identification requirements.137 
Despite the use of the phrase ‘may not’, the identification and verification provisions 
of section 21 are mandatory. The use of the words ‘may not’ can also be understood 
                                                 
130 Section 43(a) read with section 62 of FICA. 
131 Section 22 of FICA. 
132 Section 23 of FICA. 
133  Van Jaarsveld Aspects of South African Money Laundering Law 480-481. 
 
134  Section 21(1) (a) of FICA.  
 
135  Section 21(1) (b) of FICA. 
 
136  Section 21(1) (c) of FICA. 
 
137  Section 21(1) of FICA. 
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to mean that banks retain a discretion as to whether they want to carry out a CDD or 
not before a business relationship can be established. To compartmentalise the 
words ‘may’ and ‘shall’ and to try to determine the real force of section 21 of FICA 
would be an exercise in futility. The solution is provided in Lion Match Co Ltd v 
Wessels.138 The intention of the legislation is quite sufficiently stated in the preamble 
to the Act: to impose certain duties on institutions and other persons who might be 
used for money laundering purposes and the financing of terrorist and related 
activities. The banks are therefore duty bound to carry out the customer identification 
and verification duties. The duties cannot be carried out at the bank’s convenience 
and pleasure. 
The identification and verification provisions of FICA are not cast in stone. It is not a 
situation of comply or die. The Minister may, after consultation with the MLAC139 and 
the FIC,140 exempt a bank from compliance with any of the provision of the Act.141 
3.2.3. A Risk-based Approach to Client Identification 
                                                 
138 Lion Match Co Ltd v Wessels 1946 OPD 376 at 380 where it was held that: 
It is now generally accepted that much learning has been wasted on the spurious classification of 
laws into perfectae, minus quam perfectae and perfectae and that the rescript of Theodosius and 
Valentian recorded in 1.12.5 has no bearing on modern statutes. Ultimately the problem resolves 
itself into the question which was the intention of the legislator, and this intention must be derived 
from the words of the statute itself, its general plan and its objects. 
139 The MLAC is established by section 17 of FICA. Its functions are to advise the Minister of 
Finance on policies and best practices to identify the proceeds of unlawful activities and to 
combat money laundering activities (see section 18(1) (a) (i) of FICA). 
 
140 The FIC is a creature of section 2 of FICA as an institution outside the public service but 
within the public administration (see section 2(1) of FICA). The main objective of the FIC is to 
assist in the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities and the combating of money 
laundering activities and the financing of terrorist and related activities (see section 3(1) of 
FICA). 
 
141 See section 74 of FICA. It is axiomatic that the provisions that the Minister can exempt an 
accountable institution from compliance including the CIV requirements in terms of section 21 
of FICA. 
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Banks are required to adopt a risk-based approach when verifying customer 
information.142 A risk-based approach is in accordance with Recommendation 5 of 
the FATF, which states that: 
Financial institutions should apply each of the CDD measures under (a) to (d) above, but may 
determine the extent of such measures on a risk sensitive basis depending on the type of 
customer, business relationship or transaction. The measures that are taken should be 
consistent with any guidelines issued by competent authorities. For higher risk categories, 
financial institutions should perform enhanced due diligence. In certain circumstances, where 
there are low risks, countries may decide that financial institutions can apply reduced or 
simplified measures. 
The risk-based approach is in sharp contrast to the rule-based approach.143 Even 
though there is no international consensus on the meaning of the term, the 
preference of the risk-based approach is a result of the failure of the rule-based 
approach.144  
3.2.4. Additional Information in High-risk Cases 
An accountable institution must obtain additional information from or in respect of an 
existing client who has established a business relationship or concludes a single 
transaction145 or a prospective client seeking to establish a business relationship or 
                                                 
142 Guidance Note 1 2–7. The risk-based approach parallels the approach that has been 
advocated in the EU, England and the Wolfsberg Group of Private Banks (see Van Jaarsveld 
Aspects of South African Money Laundering Law 484). 
143 According to the rule-based approach, the relevant authority, the FIC in South Africa, 
determines the nature of the AML/CFT risk and formulates clear customer due diligence rules 
that banks must follow to counter those risks. The rules are quite inflexible and cannot be 
easily changed to address new risks (see De Koker South African Money Laundering and 
Terror Financing Law 8-43). 
144 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-44, who remarked 
that the term ‘risk-based approach’ means an approach that allows an institution to heighten 
its rule-based CDD measures when confronted with higher risk scenarios. 
145 Regulation 21(1) (a) of FICA. 
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conclude a single transaction.146 The additional information must be obtained only 
when it is reasonably necessary having regard to any guidance notes concerning the 
verification of identities or the reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions which 
may apply to that institution.147 The bank must collect additional information 
concerning a business relationship or single transaction which poses a particularly 
high risk of facilitating money laundering activities.148 The additional information must 
also be collected with a view to enabling the bank to identify the proceeds of unlawful 
activity or money laundering activities.149 The regulation confines itself to the fight 
against money laundering and identifying the proceeds of unlawful activities.150 
The information which an accountable institution must obtain in the circumstances 
referred to in regulation 21(2) must be sufficient to reasonably enable the institution 
to determine whether or not transactions involving a client referred to in regulation 
21(1) are consistent with the institution’s knowledge of that client and that client’s 
business activities and must include particulars in relation to the source of that 
client’s income and the source of the funds which that client expects to use in 
concluding the single transaction or transactions in the course of the business 
relationship.151 It has been argued that regulation 21 may be ultra vires.152  
                                                 
146 Regulation 21(1) (b) of FICA. 
147 Regulation 21(2) of FICA. 
148 Regulation 21(2) (a) FICA. 
149 Regulation 21(2) (b) of FICA. 
150 This makes it too limited to provide sufficient support for a risk-based customer due diligence 
approach for AML/CFT purposes. It is further not broad enough to address key risks linked to 
the financing of terrorism (De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing 
Law 8-20). 
151 Regulation 21(3) of FICA. 
152 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-20. The argument 
seems to be premised on the belief that FICA prescribes for only a one-size-fits-all approach. 
It does not make provision for enhanced customer due diligence for clients who pose a higher 
risk. If enhanced customer due diligence is not prescribed by FICA, so the argument goes, 
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3.2.5. FIC Guidance Notes on the Risk-based Approach 
In accordance with Recommendation 5 of the FATF Forty Recommendations, the 
FIC in April 2004153 issued Guidance Note 1, which gave general guidance to a risk 
based approach.154 Guidance Note 1 states that banks are not required, in terms of 
their CIV obligations under FICA, to follow a one-size-fits-all approach. Rather, a 
bank must determine in specific instances what information may be required in order 
to achieve verification of the particulars of a client and the means by which the said 
verification can be achieved. The use of the phrases as ‘can reasonably be expected 
to achieve such verification and ‘is obtained by reasonably practical means’, 
according to Guidance Note 1, envisages a risk-based approach in the verification of 
client’s particulars, and this means that the greater the risk, the higher the level of 
verification, and the more secure the methods of verification used should be. 
Whenever the phrases ‘can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification’ and 
‘is obtained by reasonably practical means’ are employed in the Regulations, a bank 
must always try to strike a balance between the accuracy of the verification required 
and the level of effort invested in the means to obtain such verification, and the said 
balance must be commensurate with the nature of the risk involved in a given 
business relationship or transaction. 
Guidance Note 1 makes a bold statement that the application of a risk-based 
approach to the verification process implies that a bank can accurately assess the 
risk involved in entering into a business relationship with a particular client and 
hence be able to make an informed decision on the basis of its risk assessment as to 
                                                                                                                                                        
the Minister of Finance is not empowered to issue regulations that require banks to obtain 
information from clients that go beyond the establishment and verification of their identities. 
153 Government Notice 534 published in the Government Gazette 26278 of 30 April 2004. 
154 The Guidance Note, provided for information only, was prepared to assist banks with the 
practical application of the client identification requirements of FICA. It, the Guidance Note, 
was never intended to serve as legal advice and to replace FICA and the MLC regulations 
issued under FICA in December 2002 (see the introduction to Guidance Note 1). 
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the appropriate methods and levels of verification that should be applied in a given 
situation.155  
A manager of a bank who has to determine the relevant risk that his bank will be 
taking by entering into a business relationship with a particular client will have to ask 
himself how a reasonable manager in a comparable institution would rate the risk 
involved with regard to a particular client, a particular product and a particular 
transaction, and secondly, what likelihood, danger or possibility can be foreseen of 
money laundering occurring with the client profile, product type or transaction in 
question.156 The risk that a client poses to the bank must be determined on a holistic 
basis, that is, the ultimate risk rating accorded to a particular client must be a 
function of all factors which may be relevant to the combination of a particular client 
profile, product type and transaction.157 
Guidance Note 1 further provides a risk matrix that could serve as an objective basis 
to the assessment of several risk indicators.158 The risk matrix links risk weightings 
to various elements such as the type of client and the nature of the intended 
transaction or business relationship.159  There are 3 risk classes, low, medium and 
high. A risk class of a score of between 10 and 29 is classified as low risk, a risk 
class with a score of 30-39 is classified as medium risk, while a score of 40 and 
higher will classify one as high risk. A client on a United Nations list scores highest 
on the matrix, +50, and a client who has been in a banking relationship with a bank 
for less than a year is weighed at 30, that is, he is considered medium risk. If the 
banking relationship is continued for a period of between one year and five years, 
the risk that a client poses to the bank will decline by half to a score of +15, putting 
                                                 
155 A bold statement, because risk can never be accurately assessed. 
156 Guidance Note 1. 
157 Guidance Note 1. 
158 Guidance Note 1. 
159 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 116 8-46(2). 
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him in the middle of the low risk class. A bank that acts on behalf of a client is 
classified as the lowest of the low risk class, +10.160   
The Guidance Note further provides for additional weighting based on the nature of 
the product. A credit term of less than 6 months is considered medium risk with a 
score of +30. If the same credit facility endures for between 6 months and twelve 
months, the risk will decline to +10. The guidance note considers the facilitation of 
the movement of funds across borders by banks as low risk, with a score of +20. 
Dealers in high value goods, import and export merchants and high cash-generating 
businesses are weighed at +30. By this weighing, it is assumed that a bank knows 
the type of business that the client conducts even though a bank, during the account-
opening stage, is not required to interrogate the client as to his occupation or source 
of funds.161 
Foreigners are lumped into three categories. Individuals from the ‘A Countries’, 
comprising of all FATF members excluding the United States of America (USA) and 
the United Kingdom (UK), are weighted at 20. The USA and the UK are categorised, 
together with all non FATF members, under ‘B Countries’.162 Foreign clients that 
pose the highest risk are those whose countries have been classified as non-
compliant countries and territories by the FATF,163 ‘C countries’. Client conduct also 
                                                 
160 In terms of the risk matrix, the minimum score is +10. 
161 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-46(2). The bank 
cannot therefore reasonably be expected to know whether a particular client is an 
export/import merchant or deals in high value goods. Ceteris paribus, it will be easy for a bank 
to know whether a client is involved in a high cash-generating business from the volume and 
regularity of the deposits that the client makes. 
162 It is unclear why the UK and USA, despite their comprehensive AML legislation and 
regulatory compliance, are singled out and classified with non FATF members. 
163 These will include Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). The FATF 
has called on its members and urged all jurisdictions to advise their financial institutions to 
give special attention to business relationships and transactions with Iran, including Iranian 
companies and financial institutions. In addition to enhanced scrutiny, the FATF has called on 
its members and urged all jurisdictions to apply effective counter-measures to protect their 
financial sectors from money laundering and the financing of terrorism (ML/FT) risks 
emanating from Iran and the DPRK. The following countries have been identified as having 
strategic AML/CFT deficiencies and have not made sufficient progress in addressing those 
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attracts risk weighting. The following client conduct attracts a weighting of +40; 
where a client’s prospective use of the bank’s facilities lacks business sense, where 
a client is unduly concerned with secrecy, where a client is not forthcoming with 
information as to the source of his funds or the nature of his business, and where a 
client is not particularly concerned with the costs of his transaction. 
3.2.6. Guidance Note 3 
This Guidance Note was published in 2005.164 It sought to identify risk indicators to 
be used to differentiate between clients. Certain factors are identified as indications 
that a business relationship or a single transaction poses a high risk of facilitating 
money laundering activities, or the presence of the proceeds of unlawful activities. 
Banks are warned to be alert in the following circumstances:165 
i) A client appears to have accounts with several banks in one geographical area.166 
ii) A client wishes to have credit and debit cards sent to destinations other than his address.167 
iii) A client is reluctant to provide complete information regarding his activities;168 
                                                                                                                                                        
deficiencies or have not committed to an action plan developed with the FATF to address the 
said deficiencies: Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Kenya, Myanmar, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, São Tomé and Príncipe, Sri Lanka, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, 
Vietnam and Yemen (see FATF Public Statement www.fatf-gafi.org (date of use: 28 July 
2012)).   
164 Government Notice 715 of 18 July 2005: Guidance for Banks on Customer Identification and 
Verification of Related Matters. 
165 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 3. 
166 Money Laundering Red Flags www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/Deposit_Acct.pdf 
(date of use: 28 July 2012).The accounts are normally opened for no legitimate reason and 
may be in the same names or in different names with different signature authorities. The only 
link between the accounts will be inter-account transfers. 
167 The provision is similar to Article 27, ‘Book Of Rules Bosnia and Herzegovina on Data, 
Information, Documents, Identification Methods and Minimum other Indicators Required for 
Efficient Implementation of Provisions of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering’ 
(2005) (available at www.imolin.org (date of use: 28 July 2012). 
168 This will obviously be intended to disguise the client’s true identity and or source of funds. It is 
the modus operandi of criminals to always try to hide their true identities and the true source 
of their funds. 
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iv) A business client’s representatives avoid contact with the branch; 
Viewed in their proper, isolated context, the scenarios postulated above may 
constitute legitimate business transactions. However, that should not detract a bank 
from its responsibility to be always on the lookout for transactions/behaviours that 
expose it to more than average risk. The information that a bank must obtain in the 
aforegoing circumstances must be adequate to reasonably enable the bank to 
determine whether transactions involving a client are consistent with the bank’s 
knowledge of that client and that client’s business activities, and must include 
particulars concerning: 
i) The source of that client’s income; and 
ii) The source of the funds that the particular client expects to use in concluding the single 
transaction or transactions in the course of the business relationship.169 
3.3. Client Identification 
3.3.1. The Manner in which Client Identification must be Conducted  
Client identification and verification must be done in accordance with Regulations 2 
to 18.170 Regulations 2 to 18 prescribe the steps that must be undertaken to 
establish and verify the identity of the following clients: South African citizens and 
residents, foreign nationals, close corporations and South African companies, foreign 
companies, other legal persons, partnerships and trusts. 
The FIC also issues guidance notes concerning the verification of identities, the 
reporting of suspicious and unusual transactions and any other obligations imposed 
on accountable institutions by FICA.171 
                                                 
169 Guidance Note 1. 
170 Regulation 2(2) of FICA. 
 
171 FICA’s General Guidance Concerning Identification of Clients, Government Notice 534, 
published in Government Gazette 26278. The Guidance Note was issued in terms of section 
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3.3.2. Client Identification Requirements (Citizens and Residents) 
Regulation 3 prescribes the information that must be established in respect of all 
natural persons who are citizens of or resident in the Republic of South Africa. The 
person’s full names, date of birth, identity number, income tax registration number (if 
such a number has been issued to that person) and residential address must be 
established.172 
Having obtained this information, a bank must take a further step and verify the 
information that was obtained during the first stage, i.e. the identification stage. It is 
never enough only to obtain the prescribed particulars relating to the identity of a 
client.173 A bank must verify the full names, date of birth and identity number of a 
natural person by comparing these particulars with an identification document of that 
person.174 If that person is, for a reason that is acceptable to the bank, unable to 
produce an identification document, another document issued to that person can be 
used, which, taking into account any guidance notes concerning the verification of 
identities which may apply to that institution, is acceptable to the institution and bears 
a photograph of that person, that person’s full names or initials and surname, that 
person’s date of birth, and that person’s identity number.175 
The reasons for the failure to produce an identification document must be noted and 
recorded by the bank, together with the details of the staff member who recorded the 
information.176 Only in exceptional cases will a valid South African driver’s licence be 
                                                                                                                                                        
4(c) to assist banks with the practical application of certain client identification and client 
verification of FICA (see the Preface to Guidance Note 3). 
 
 
172 Regulation 3(1) of FICA. 
 
173 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-6. 
 
174 Regulation 4(1) (a) (i) of FICA. 
 
175 Regulation 4(1) (a) (ii) of FICA. 
 
176 Guidance Note 1 Paragraph 6. 
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accepted as a valid form of alternative verification. A bank must verify the income tax 
registration number referred to in regulation 3(1) (d) by comparing this number with a 
document issued by the South African Revenue Services bearing such a number 
and the name of the natural person.177  
The residential address referred to in regulation 3(1) (e) or 3(2) (f) must be verified 
by comparing these particulars with information which can reasonably be expected 
to achieve such verification and is obtained by reasonably practical means, taking 
into account any guidance notes concerning the verification of identities which may 
apply to that institution.178 The safest way for the bank to verify the address of a 
client is for an employee/agent of the bank to visit the residential address of the 
client to verify if indeed the client resides at the stated address.179 
3.3.3. Client Identification for Foreign Nationals 
The identification requirements are the same for foreign nationals as for South 
African citizens and residents except that instead of producing an identity document 
bearing his/her identity number,180 a foreign national will identify himself/herself with 
a passport and his/her nationality must be ascertained.181 
                                                 
177 Regulation 4(2) of FICA. However, Exemption 6(2) exempts all accountable institutions from 
obtaining and verifying the prescribed tax information. 
 
178 Regulation 4(3) of FICA. 
 
179 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. In most instances it would be sufficient to review the 
document and to obtain a copy of a document that offers a reasonable confirmation of the 
information in question. Since the documentation must be current, a good practice would be 
to require documentation that is less than three months old (see Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 
11). It is my submission that visiting each and every client’s residential address will unduly 
escalate the cost of doing business not to the bank only but also to the client. The bank will 
simply pass on the cost of this exercise to the client through bank charges. However, it will be 
prudent for the bank to visit the said address where it bears a reasonable suspicion that the 
client is lying about his/her residential address. For instance, if the bank suspect that the 
client does not reside at the particular address or the said address does not exist it will be in 
order for the bank to visit the given address for verification purposes.  
 
180 The Guidance Note defines an identification document, in respect of a natural person who is a 
citizen of, or is resident in the Republic, as an official identity document.  In respect of non-
citizens and non-residents, an identification document will be a passport issued by the country 
of which that person is a citizen (Regulation 1 of FICA). 
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The foreign national must provide his/her full names and, by necessary implication, 
those will be the names appearing on his/her passport. In the event that the passport 
contains initials, the foreign national must provide his/her full names over and above 
the initials on his passport. The passport must be valid. An expired passport is of no 
use, as its validity has come to an end and its identifying abilities have also ceased 
to function.  As a measure of extra caution, the bank must ask for a certified copy of 
the passport. The passport must be certified by the relevant embassy. This is to help 
the bank to be doubly sure that it is being supplied with a genuine document. It is 
quite unlikely that the embassy will certify a fraudulent document.182  
The foreign national must provide his/her fixed place of abode. Even though it is 
possible for one to stay in a hotel for an extended period of time, hotel addresses 
must not ordinarily be accepted due to their temporary nature. Last but not least, the 
foreign national must provide his/her contact particulars. Ordinarily, this will be his 
postal address, e-mail address, telephone number and mobile phone number.183 
A bank must verify the particulars obtained in terms of regulation 5(1) (a), (b), (c) and 
(d) or 5(2) (a), (b), (c) and (d) from or in respect of a natural person who is not a 
citizen of the Republic and not resident in the Republic, by comparing those 
particulars with an identification document of that person.184 
Information obtained in terms of regulation 5(1) (e) must be verified by the particulars 
contained therein with a document issued by the South African Revenue Services 
bearing such a number.185 The particulars referred to in sub regulation (1) or (2) 
must be verified with information which is obtained from any other independent 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
181 Regulation 5 of FICA. 
 
182 See Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 15 and Regulation 6(3). 
183 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 15. 
184 Regulation 6(1) of FICA. 
 
185 Regulation 6(2). 
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source if it is believed to be reasonably necessary taking into account any guidance 
notes concerning the verification of identities which may apply to the bank. 
Guidance Note 15 provides further elucidation on the steps that a bank must 
undertake to verify the identity of a foreign national. When a bank requires further 
verification of the identity of a foreign national, the bank may obtain such information 
by requesting for a letter of confirmation from a person in authority (for example, 
from the relevant embassy) which confirms the authenticity of that person’s passport. 
Decisions concerning when further confirmation of the identity of a foreign national is 
required will be based on the bank’s risk framework.  
3.3.4. Identification of Close Corporations and South African Companies 
A close corporation or a company,186 as artificial persons, cannot act on their own. In 
transacting with the said artificial persons a bank must obtain the following 
information from the natural person who acts or purports to act on behalf of a close 
corporation or a South African company with which it is establishing a business 
relationship or concluding a single transaction:187 
i) The registered name of the close corporation or company; 
ii) The registration number under which the close corporation or company is incorporated; 
iii) The registered address of the close corporation or company 
                                                 
186 In terms of  Section 1 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: 
 
A company means a juristic person incorporated in terms of this Act, or a juristic person that, 
immediately before the effective date— 
a) was registered in terms of the— 
i. Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), other than as an external company as defined in 
that Act; or 
ii. Close Corporations Act, 1984 (Act No. 69 of 1984), if it has subsequently been converted in 
terms of Schedule 2; 
b) was in existence and recognised as an ‘existing company’ in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 
(Act No. 61 of 1973); or 
c) was deregistered in terms of the Companies Act, 1973 (Act No. 61 of 1973), and has 
subsequently been re-registered in terms of this Act. 
187 Regulation 7(a) – (e). 
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iv) The name under which the close corporation or company conducts business; 
v) The address from which the close corporation or company operates, or if it operates from 
multiple addresses; the address of the office seeking to establish a business relationship or to 
enter into a single transaction with the accountable institution; and 
vi) The address of its head office. 
In the case of a company, the bank needs to ascertain the full names, date of birth 
and identity number referred to in regulation 3(1) (a),(b) and (c) or full names, date of 
birth and name of the country referred to in regulation 5(1) (a),(b) and (c), as may be 
applicable, concerning: 
i) The manager of the company;  and 
ii) Each natural person who purports to be authorised to establish a business relationship or to 
enter into a transaction with the accountable institution on behalf of the company.188 
The following information concerning the natural or legal person, partnership or trust 
holding 25% or more of the voting rights at a general meeting of the company 
concerned must be obtained: 
i. the full names, date of birth and identity number referred to in regulation 3(1) (a),(b) 
and (c) or full names; 
ii. date of birth and name of the country referred to in regulation 5(1) (a),(b) and (c), 
registered name; 
iii. registration number, registered address, trade name and business address referred 
to in regulation 7 (a), (b), (c), (d) and (e); 
iv. Names, numbers and addresses referred to in regulation 9(a), (b), and (c); 
v. Name, address and legal form referred to in regulation 11(a), (b) and (c), name 
referred to in regulation 13(a) or name and number referred to in regulation 15(a), as 
may be applicable.189 
In transacting with a close corporation, the bank must ascertain the full names, date 
of birth and identity number referred to in regulation 3(1) (a),(b) and (c) or the full 
                                                 
188 Regulation 7(f) (i) of FICA. Regulation 3(1) (a), (b) and (c) of FICA refers to detailed 
information that must be obtained from a South African citizen, while regulation 5(1) (a), (b) 
and (c) concerns information that must be collected from foreign nationals. 
 
189 Regulation 7(f) (ii) of FICA. 
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names, date of birth and name of the country referred to in regulation 5(1) (a), (b) 
and (c), as may be applicable, concerning each member and each natural person 
who purports to be authorised to establish a business relationship or to enter into a 
transaction with the accountable institution on behalf of the close corporation.190 
The residential address and contact particulars of the manager of the company must 
be obtained. The same applies to each natural or legal person, partnership or trust 
holding 25% or more of the voting rights at a general meeting of the company 
concerned and to each natural person who purports to be authorised to establish a 
business relationship or to enter into a transaction with the accountable institution on 
behalf of the company concerned.191 
The residential address and contact particulars of each member, in the case of a 
close corporation, and each natural person who purports to be authorised to 
establish a business relationship or to enter into a transaction with the accountable 
institution on behalf of the close corporation must be obtained.192 The information 
obtained in terms of regulation 7(a) to (h) must be obtained by comparing the 
registered name, registration number and registered address referred to in regulation 
7(a), (b) and (c). 
In the case of a company the most recent versions of the certificate of incorporation 
and notice of registered office and postal address, bearing the stamp of the Registrar 
of Companies and signed by the company secretary, must be obtained.  In the case 
of a close corporation, the most recent versions of the founding statement and 
certificate of incorporation and amended founding statement if applicable, bearing 
the stamp of the Registrar of Close Corporations and signed by an authorised 
                                                 
190 Regulation 7(g) (i)-(ii) of FICA. 
 
191 Regulation 7(h) (i)-(ii) of FICA. 
 
192 Regulation 7(j) (i)-(ii) of FICA. 
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member or employee of the close corporation, must be made available and obtained 
from the client.193 
The trade name and business address must be compared with information which 
can reasonably be expected to achieve such verification and is obtained by 
reasonably practical means, taking into account any guidance notes concerning the 
verification of identities which may apply to banks.194 The particulars obtained may 
be compared with information which is obtained from any other independent source, 
if it is believed to be reasonably necessary, taking into account any guidance notes 
concerning the verification of identities concerning banks.195 
3.3.5. Identification of Trusts 
For trusts, the information that must be obtained is, mutatis mutandis, similar to that 
concerning companies and close corporations. For instance, instead of collecting 
regulation 7(a)-(b) information, the bank will obtain the trust’s identifying number and 
name.196 
The trust must also furnish the address of the Master of the High Court where the 
trust is registered, if applicable.197 The bank must obtain the contact particulars and 
residential address of each trustee, each natural person who purports to be 
authorised to establish a business relationship or to enter into a transaction with the 
accountable institution on behalf of the trust, each beneficiary of the trust referred to 
                                                 
193 Regulation 8(a) of FICA. 
 
194 Regulation 8(b) of FICA. 
 
195 See Regulation 8(e) of FICA. 
 
196 Regulation 15(a) of FICA. 
 
197 Regulation 15(b) of FICA. 
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by name in the trust deed or other founding instrument in terms of which the trust is 
created, and the founder of the trust.198 
A person purporting to act on behalf of the trust must produce the trustees’ resolution 
authorising him to act on behalf of the trust.199 The resolution is produced in order to 
avoid a situation where one of the trustees, or any individual for that matter, opens a 
bank account, unbeknownst to the other trustees, and uses the said bank account 
not for the benefit of the trust but for his/her own benefit. The bank account may 
even be used to defraud the trust. 
3.3.6. Identification of Non-Face to Face Customers 
Where the identifying information was obtained in a non-face to face situation,200 the 
bank must take reasonable steps to establish the existence or to establish or verify 
the identity of that person, taking into account any guidance notes concerning the 
verification of identities which may apply to that institution.201 The guidance notes 
direct banks to the Core Principles for further guidance in this matter.  
In doing business with a non-face to face client, the bank must apply customer 
identification procedures that are as effective as those that are applied to customers 
who present themselves for interview, and there must be measures in place to 
mitigate the higher risk posed by non-face to face customers.202 It must be 
established as to why that particular customer will not present himself to the bank. 
As far as possible, non-face to face customers, due to the risk that they pose, must 
be avoided. In the absence of a valid excuse as to why the customer will not 
                                                 
198 Regulation 5(g) of FICA. 
 
199 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 21. 
 
200 A typical example of a non-face to face customer is one who wishes to conduct electronic 
banking via the internet or similar technology (see CDD for Banks (2001) 9 supplemented in 
February 2003). 
 
201 Regulation 18 of FICA. 
 
202 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 9. 
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physically present himself/herself to the bank, the bank account should not be 
activated until the customer physically presents himself/herself to the bank. 
Alternatively, one of the bank staff may visit him to establish his/her existence and 
bona fides. 
The following measures must be undertaken to mitigate the risk posed by non-face 
to face customers:  
i) the documents presented before the bank must be certified to be what they purport to be by 
somebody authorised to certify documents; 
ii) the bank must request for further documents to complement those that are required for face 
to face customers; 
iii) the bank must independently contact the customer and request for a third-party 
introduction.203 
3.3.7. Identification of Politically Exposed Persons 
The term ‘Politically Exposed Persons’204 (PEPs) applies to persons who perform 
important public functions for a state.205 A bank should conduct proper due diligence 
on both a PEP and the persons acting on his/her behalf and KYC principles must be 
applied to PEPs, their family members206 and close associates.207 PEPs were 
                                                 
203 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. 
 
204 Guidance Note 3 defines a PEP as someone who is or has in the past been entrusted with 
prominent public functions in a particular country. 
205 The following are deemed to be politically exposed persons: heads of state, cabinet ministers, 
senior civil servants, senior judges and religious leaders with political connections (see 
http;//www.wolfsberg-principles.com/faq-persons.html (date of use: 15 September 2012)) 
(hereinafter Wolfsberg Principles (2005)). 
206  Family members include close family members such as spouses, children, parents and 
siblings and may also include other blood relatives and relatives by marriage (Wolfsberg 
Principles (2005)). 
 
207 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 25 states that close associates will include close business 
colleagues and personal advisors/consultants to the politically exposed person as well as 
persons who obviously benefit significantly from being close to such a person (see Wolfsberg 
Principles http://www.wolfsbergprinciples.com/pdf/standards/Wolfsberg_RBA Guidance.pdf 
(date of use: 20 June 2013)). 
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formally referred to as ‘potentates’ and were deemed to have the potential to expose 
the bank to significant reputational risk.208 
There is always a danger that PEPs may abuse their positions of power for their own 
enrichment through the receipt of bribes, corruption and embezzlement.209 A bank 
that concludes a transaction with a PEP must always guard against the possibility of 
its being used as a laundry machine or a conduit for the proceeds of bribery, 
corruption and funds stolen from the public purse. 
PEPs are classified as high-risk clients. Over and above meeting the normal CDD 
requirements, the opening of a bank account for a PEP must be approved by senior 
management of the bank, the PEP’s source of funds must be established and the 
PEP’s bank account must be constantly monitored.210 
The Wolfsberg Group acknowledges the immense challenges faced by banks in 
identifying PEPs. For instance, a PEP may deliberately provide wrong information or 
refuse to provide information to the bank.211 PEPs must always be regarded as high-
risk clients and be subjected to enhanced due diligence. The same enhanced due 
diligence must be applied to members of their families and their close associates.  
Where a PEP, a member of his/her family or close associate is a beneficial owner of 
the assets concerned in a contractual relationship or has the power of disposal over 
                                                 
208 CDD for Banks (2001). Paragraph 41 states that: 
 
Business relationships with individuals holding important public positions and with persons or 
companies clearly related to them may expose a bank to significant reputational and/or legal 
risks. There is always a possibility, especially in countries where corruption is widespread, that 
such persons abuse their public powers for their own illicit enrichment through the receipt of 
bribes, embezzlement, etc. 
209 FATF (2010) 241-242. By virtue of their positions, PEPs have untrammeled access to the 
public purse and financial arrangements such as budgets, bank accounts, publicly controlled 
companies and contracts. This arrangement allows PEPs to be able to award contracts and 
get kickbacks in return. 
 
210 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 26. This is in exact conformity with Recommendation 6 of the 
FATF Forty Recommendations. 
 
211 Answer to question 5 of the Wolfsberg Principles (2005). 
  
 49 
 
assets by virtue of a power of attorney or signature authorisation, enhanced due 
diligence must be performed.212 This is clearly meant to address situations where 
PEPs or related persons hide behind ‘fronts’ in their dealings with financial 
institutions. 
There are a number of factors that contribute to the increase or decrease of the risk 
associated with dealing with a PEP. The risks of dealing with a PEP from a 
corruption-prone country are higher than the risks of dealing with persons from 
countries that are perceived to be less corrupt.213 Not all PEPs are equal. The higher 
the rank in government the higher the risk that the PEP may be involved in money 
laundering crimes. For instance, a ward councillor poses a lesser risk than a Member 
of the Executive Council or even a Premier of a province. The size of the business 
relationship that a PEP wants to conclude with a bank is also an indication of the 
level of risk connected with that person.  
The types of products and services offered to a PEP have a bearing on the level of 
risk associated with that person. Certain categories of services comprise a high level 
of risk due to their nature. 214 
Being on the alert does not mean that PEPs must be denied access to the financial 
sector. Like all other citizens, they have the right of access to the banking services 
and it will be wrong to assume that since one is a PEP one has been dipping one’s 
hands in the public purse. The bank should proceed from a basic premise that not all 
PEPs are thieves who are looking for a safe place to deposit their ill-gotten wealth. 
However, a bank is required to acknowledge the immense risk that is posed by this 
                                                 
212 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 26. 
 
213 According to Transparency International, corruption destroys lives and communities and 
undermines institutions (available at www.transparency.org (date of use: 5 February 2013)). 
An application to open a bank account by a Somali resident, Somalia being the most corrupt 
country in the world, must be examined with more scrutiny than that of a citizen of Denmark, 
the least corrupt country in the world.  
 
214 According to the FATF on Politically Exposed Persons in Relation to AML/CFT  
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf 
(date of use: 5 November 2013), the risks can be managed by applying enhanced CDD. 
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group of potential clients, and must develop appropriate measures to mitigate that 
risk.  
As it is, FICA does not prohibit banks from dealing with PEPs. One can assume that 
by subjecting PEPs to enhanced due diligence, a bank runs the risk of putting itself 
on a collision course with the government. As rulers of the day, PEPs from the ruling 
party may feel that they are being undermined by being subjected to thorough 
questioning from bank officials before an account can be opened for them.  
The questioning may offend the PEP with the result that the business stream flowing 
from the government to the bank may suddenly dry up. If, for instance, the President 
of the Republic were to walk into the bank and ask to open a bank account, senior 
management would attend to him and try as hard as possible to make the 
experience painless and less time consuming. It is my submission that no bank in its 
right mind will not want to have the President of the Republic as a client. There are 
immense business opportunities in having the President, or any PEP for that matter, 
as a client.  
That is the challenge facing the financial institutions. At times, the bank will have to 
choose between a rock - pleasing a PEP by not asking ‘intrusive’ questions - and a 
hard place - complying with the law and subjecting a PEP to enhanced due 
diligence. The bank is required to perform a delicate balancing act by ensuring that it 
does not offend its potential customers and at the same time complies with the 
relevant legislation. When all is said and done, due diligence for PEPs must be 
performed without fear or favour. 
3.4. Verification  
As discussed above, documents which are provided by prospective clients to the 
banks must not be accepted at face value. They have to be verified. Likewise, 
verification of residential addresses and verification in the absence of a contact 
person must be conducted. 
3.4.1. Verification of Residential Address 
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Guidance Note 3 provides a list, by no means exhaustive, of documents that may be 
used as confirmation of a client’s residential address. The documents are: 
i. a utility, water or electricity, bill; 
ii. a bank statement from another bank reflecting the name and residential address of 
the person if the person previously transacted with the bank registered in terms of the 
Banks Act and that bank has confirmed the person’s particulars; 
iii. a recent lease or rental agreement; 
iv. a municipal rates and taxes invoice; 
v. a telephone or cellular phone account; 
vi. a mortgage statement from another institution; 
vii. a valid television licence; 
viii. a recent long-term or short-term insurance policy document issued by an insurance 
company; and 
ix. recent motor vehicle licence documentation.  
Since the whole point of requesting the aforegoing documents is to verify the 
residential address of the customer, the document must reflect the customer’s name 
and residential address.215 
A utility bill that does not reflect the person’s residential address will still be 
acceptable provided that the customer’s name and erf/stand and township details 
are reflected on the utility bill. The customer’s physical address, erf number and 
township must be recorded in the customer’s file and the township cross-referenced 
to the suburb in which the customer resides.216 
In case of a doubt about the customer or his physical address, the erf/stand and 
township details should be verified by reference to the Deeds Office.217 In the 
absence of the documents mentioned above, the bank may request that the person 
living with the client to depose to an affidavit containing the client’s name, residential 
                                                 
215  Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. 
 
216 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. 
 
217 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. 
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address and identity number, similar information about the deponent, the relationship 
between the client and the deponent, and confirmation of the client’s residential 
address.218 
3.4.2. Verification in Absence of Contact Person 
If a client acts for another person, the identity of that other person must be 
established and verified and the client’s authority to act for and on behalf of that 
other person must be ascertained.219 The bank must obtain from the person acting 
on behalf of the other person information that provides proof of that person’s 
authority to act on behalf of that other person.  
The information must be verified by comparing the information of the person and 
establishing whether that information, prima facie, provides proof of the necessary 
authorisation. The person acting on behalf of another may provide the following 
documents to confirm his authority to act on behalf of another person and the 
particulars of the instructing party authorising the third party to establish the 
relationship; (1) power of attorney (2) mandate (3) resolution duly executed by 
authorised signatories or (3) a court order authorising the third party to conduct 
business on behalf of another person.220 
Clearly it is a requirement that banks ought to verify the identity of their customers, 
but for every legal rule, there is an exemption. Section 21 exempts banks from 
verifying the identity of customers under certain circumstances.   
3.5. Exemption from Verification  
The strict identification and verification regime created by section 21 of FICA is 
moderated by a number of exemptions targeted at smaller, low-risk customers and 
                                                 
218 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 11. 
 
219 Section 21 of FICA. 
  
220 Guidance Note 3 Paragraph 12. 
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low-risk transactions.221 The exemptions have been criticised as having the potential 
to negate the very essence of the identification and verification requirements of 
FICA.222 
A bank is exempt from complying with section 21 where it accepts a mandate from a 
citizen or resident client to commence a business relationship or to conclude a single 
transaction.223 It not being a wholesale exemption, the bank will be exempted from 
complying with the CDD requirements only upon the conditions that the single 
transaction or business relationship: 
i) must allow the account holder to transfer, withdraw or make payments from that account not 
exceeding R5 000.00 per day and R25 000.00 in a monthly cycle; 
ii) enables the account holder to receive a deposit or a series of deposits over a period of 24 
hours into that account not exceeding; (i) on more than one occasion in a calendar month, an 
amount of R5 000.00 and (ii) at any time, an amount of R20 000.00; 
iii) enables the account holder to maintain a balance in that account not exceeding R25 000.00 
at any time and; 
iv) does not enable the account holder to effect a transfer of funds out of the account to any 
destination outside the Republic save where the transfer is a result of a point of sale payment 
or a cash withdrawal in the Rand Common Monetary Area (i.e. point of sale payments in 
Lesotho, Swaziland and Namibia).224 
Exemption 3 can be invoked only where the account does not remain inactive for a 
period exceeding 6 months, if the business relationship entails the holding of an 
account. Also, the balance maintained in the said bank account must not exceed 
R25 000.00 at any time and the account holder must not hold a similar bank account 
with the same bank. This is obviously meant to avoid a situation where a person who 
                                                 
221 De Koker 2004 TSAR 719. 
222 International Monetary Fund www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.htm (date of use: 5 
January 2013). 
223 Exemption 2. 
224 Exemption 3. 
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is not entitled to open a low-risk account opens multiple low-risk accounts in order to 
side-step the identification and verification obligations of section 21 of FICA. 
The bank is further allowed to take preparatory steps with a view to establishing a 
business relationship or concluding a single transaction before the bank has verified 
the identity of that customer in accordance with section 21 of the Act.225 
The exemption is conditional upon the bank having completed all the necessary 
steps to verify the identity of that client in accordance with section 21 of the Act 
before the institution concludes a transaction in the course of the resultant business 
relationship or performs any act to give effect to the resultant single transaction.226 
The bank is further exempted from the duty of complying with the CIV requirements 
of FICA in respect of a business relationship or single transaction which is 
established or concluded with that institution (the second accountable institution) by 
another accountable institution (the primary accountable institution) acting on behalf 
of a client of the primary accountable institution, subject to the condition that the 
primary accountable institution confirms in writing to the satisfaction of the second 
accountable institution  that it has complied with the CIV requirements of section 21 
of FICA. 
Further confirmation is required that in terms of its internal rules and the procedures 
ordinarily applied in the course of establishing business relationships or concluding 
single transactions, the primary accountable institutions will have established and 
verified, in accordance with FICA, the identity of every client on whose behalf it will 
                                                 
225 De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-9. 
 
226 Exemption 2 of FICA. Exemption 2 is a ‘softening’ exemption to the prohibitions of section 21 
of FICA (see De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 8-9). 
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be establishing business relationships or concluding single transactions with the 
second accountable institution.227 
A bank is exempted from complying with the CIV obligations in terms of section 21 of 
FICA when dealing with clients based in foreign countries. The exemption comes 
into play only if the client is situated in a country where, to the satisfaction of the 
relevant supervisory body, AML and supervision of compliance with such AML 
regulation, which is equivalent to that which applies to the accountable institution, is 
in force.228 
The institution or person in the country referred to above must confirm in writing to 
the satisfaction of the accountable institution that the person or institution has 
verified the particulars concerning that client which the accountable institution has 
obtained in accordance with section 21 of the FICA,229 and the person or institution 
referred to above must undertake to forward all the documents obtained in the 
course of verifying such particulars to the accountable institution.230 
3.6.  Due Diligence in the Context of CFT 
A bank account can be used to convey funds that are intended to be used in terrorist 
attacks.231 To curb the financing of terrorist activities, it is imperative that thorough 
                                                 
227 This exemption was motivated by the FIC Money Laundering Control Regulations(September 
2002) in the following terms ‘It often happens that a client is referred by one accountable 
institution to another or that one accountable institution represents a client doing business 
with another. An example of this is where a client of a bank wishes to buy an investment or 
insurance product with another financial institution through his or her bank. The bank refers 
the client to a second institution or carries out the purchase from the second institution on 
behalf of the client. If the second institution may not rely on the identification and verification 
of the client done by the first institution (the bank) a duplication of effort will occur’ (see De 
Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 10-7) 
 
228 Exemption 5(a). 
 
229 Exemption 5(b). 
 
230 Exemption 5(c). 
 
 
231 Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 187. 
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due diligence be applied when opening a bank account for a customer. Terrorism, 
however carried, is usually intended to gain political change by violent and non 
constitutional means.232 Consequently, POCDATARA was enacted to bring to justice 
those engaged in terrorist activities and further to comply with international 
instruments dealing with terrorism and related activities.233 The fight against the 
financing of terrorism is part of ensuring a sound and stable financial system 
characterised by integrity and expanded public access.234 
It is an offence to assist terrorists to further their ends. The assistance to terrorists 
may be in the form of offering one’s skill or expertise to a terrorist.235 It goes without 
saying that terrorists need banks to move around funds to finance their criminal 
activities. It would be in contravention of section 3(1) of POCDATARA for a bank to 
blithely open a bank account for a terrorist organization. Where a bank believes, or 
strongly suspects that an account is likely to be used to channel funds intended for 
terrorist activities, such application to open a bank account must be refused. The 
consequences of a breach of section 3(1) and 4 are quite dire.236 
3.7. Conclusion 
                                                 
232 See the Preamble to POCDATARA. 
233 See the Preamble to POCDATARA. South Africa criminalised terrorist financing in section 4 of 
POCDATARA.  
234 https://www.fic.gov.za/DownloadContent/news/press release/FIC_Typologies_report_FINAL.pdf 
(date of use: 6 August 2015). 
235 See section 3(1) of POCDATARA. 
236 The court may impose a sentence not exceeding 15 years or a fine not exceeding R100 million. 
See section 18(1) (b)-(c). Section 23(1) of POCDATARA empowers a court, upon application by the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions, to freeze a bank account that is reasonably suspected of 
being used to finance terrorist activities. 
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This Chapter has traced the legislative history of the KYC concept. It was found that 
the genealogy of the identification and verification obligations created by section 21 
of FICA can be traced back to a discussion paper published by the SALC in 1996. 
With the promulgation of FICA, banks were, for the first time, statutorily obliged to 
identify and verify the identity of their potential customers. It has become apparent 
during this Chapter that FICA does not prescribe a one-size-fits-all approach. The 
identification and verification obligations are carried out with emphasis being placed 
on the risk that a particular client poses. Where a client poses a higher than average 
risk to the bank, an enhanced due diligence must be carried out. One such group 
which exposes a bank to a higher than average risk are PEP. Before a bank account 
is opened for a PEP, the PEP must be subjected to an enhanced due diligence. 
The identification and verification obligations created by section 21 of FICA do not, in 
and of their own, provide detailed guidance as to the steps that a bank has to take 
before opening a bank account for a potential customer. Guidance notes have been 
issued in terms of FICA. They serve as a guide to the banks as to what information 
they ought to collect and verify during the opening of an account. 
Section 21 of FICA is not cast in stone. In appropriate circumstances a bank may be 
exempted from complying with the provisions of the said section. A bank is 
exempted from collecting and verifying certain information in appropriate 
circumstance. A brief discussion of POCDATARA was also undertaken in this 
chapter. The pith of POCDATARA is to outlaw the offence, and indeed the financing, 
of terrorism. The financing of terrorism can largely be nabbed by ensuring that banks 
do not aid and abet the offence of terrorism by collecting and moving funds on behalf 
of terrorists. 
Last but not least, a brief overview of POCDATARA was undertaken. The pith of 
POCDATARA is to protect constitutional democracy from being, so to speak, 
hijacked by terrorists. The role of banks, more especially at the account opening 
stage, is to ensure that terrorists do not gain access to the banking system by 
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denying them an opportunity to open bank accounts and channeling their funds 
through same. 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMMON LAW DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF A BANK WHEN 
OPENING A BANK ACCOUNT  
4.1. Introduction  
A bank is obliged by common law and statutory law to establish the identity of a 
potential customer and carry out its bona fide duty. Failure to do this may lead to the 
bank being held delictually liable. However, the recognition of the delictual liability of 
a collecting bank to the owner of a lost or stolen cheque has not been without 
controversy.237 This section will focus on the common law duties of the banks in 
South Africa vis a vis the opening of bank accounts.  
These common law duties safeguard the true owner of a cheque as well as any 
other persons who may suffer loss as a result of the fraudulent misuse of their 
accounts and the payment system. The common law duties will be discussed 
through cases. 
4.2. The Common Law Duties 
4.2.1. The Common Law Liability of a Collecting Bank 
The court in Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 238 was seized with the 
following question: 
                                                 
237 The controversy gave birth to a number of articles with most authors favouring the recognition 
of a collecting bank’s duty of care to avoid causing loss to the owner of a lost or stolen 
cheque by negligently dealing with it. The only dissenting voice in the debate was Cowen 
1981 TSAR 193 (see Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes 396). 
238 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) (hereinafter the Indac Electronics case). 
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Whether a collecting banker, who negligently collects payment of a cheque on behalf of a 
customer who has no title thereto, can be held liable under the lex Aquilia for pure economic 
loss sustained by the true owner of the cheque who is not its customer.239 
The question before the court was regarded as long settled in favour of a collecting 
bank in the Yorkshire Insurance case. The bone of contention between the parties 
was a cheque dated 2 May 1989 drawn by the defendant's Silverton branch in the 
sum of R58 218 in favour of the plaintiff or order. The payee was specifically stated 
as Indac Electronics. Even though the cheque was crossed and marked ‘not 
negotiable’, the defendant received the same cheque for collection on behalf of one 
M J Le Roux.240 The proceeds of the cheque were paid to the said Le Roux. The 
plaintiff alleged in its particulars of claim that the defendant owed it a duty of care 
and that it ought to have been aware of the fact that Le Roux was not entitled to 
payment of the proceeds of the cheque and that it was duty bound to deal with the 
cheque in such a way that it did not cause a loss to the plaintiff. 
In order to be successful, the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque must prove the 
following (1) that the collecting banker received payment of the cheque on behalf of 
someone who was not entitled thereto; (2) that in receiving such payment the 
collecting banker acted (3) negligently and (4) unlawfully; (5) that the conduct of the 
collecting banker caused the true owner to sustain loss; and (6) that the damages 
claimed represent proper compensation for such loss.241 The court then traversed a 
number of authorities which dealt with a duty of care and eventually held that the 
defence of indeterminate liability which parties are wont to raise should not arise in a 
case like the one that was before it for the simple reason that the extent of the loss is 
easily determinable from the face value of the cheque.242 The court further held that 
                                                 
239 At 789D. 
240 It is worthy of note that the cheque was not endorsed either specially or in blank to MJ Le Roux. 
241 At 797 C-E. 
242 At 798D-E. 
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the risk of payment being made to an unlawful possessor always looms large and 
the true owner of a cheque needs to be protected from such an eventuality.243 
The court recognised that it is common cause in banking practice that the collection 
of cheques forms part of banking business and failure to take reasonable steps may 
result in a loss to the true owner of a cheque. The court goes on to make a chilling 
observation that: 
If there were no legal duty to take reasonable care, it would mean that the collecting banker 
need not examine or even look at the  cheque to ascertain to whom it is payable. The 
crossing of a cheque would be of little consequence if no legal duty existed on the part of the 
collecting banker.244 It is only the collecting banker who is in a position to ascertain whether a 
cheque that is being collected is collected for a person who is entitled to payment therefrom. 
Once the cheque has left his hands, the true owner is not in a position to protect himself from 
the loss that he will suffer if the bank collects the cheque on behalf of someone who is not 
entitled to payment from the cheque.245 
After exploring a number of authorities,246 the court held that: 
                                                 
243 At 798I-799A. 
244 At 799D. 
245 At 799F-H. 
246 Some of the decisions that the court explored were: Leal and Co v Williams 1906 TS 554 at 
789H-J-790A-C, the Yorkshire Insurance case at 790-792, Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust 
Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (3) SA 188 (W) at 794D-H, Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van 
Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) at 794J-796A (hereinafter the Administrateur case). The 
decision in the Administrateur case is significant in that the court recognized, for the first time, 
the right to compensation for pure patrimonial loss in the following terms at 825F-H: 
It can be accepted, from what different writers have written on the subject, that the right to 
compensation for pure patrimonial loss was recognized in the Roman law in certain limited 
cases but that this right was still relative to a thing or a corpus. It can also be accepted that in 
the Roman-Dutch law compensation for pure patrimonial loss was awarded in certain cases 
which indicates that Aquilian liability was extended beyond the Roman law boundary of 
damage to property…..The birthpangs of such a right of action have endured so long that the 
time has arrived, perhaps even with a Caesarean section, that the child should be brought into 
the world.  
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There can now be no reason in principle why a collecting banker should not be held liable 
under the extended lex Aquilia for negligence to the true owner of a cheque, provided all the 
elements or requirements of Aquilian liability have been met’.247  
The defendant had excepted to the plaintiff’s particulars of claim on the grounds that 
the facts alleged therein do not give rise to a legal duty with the result that the bank’s 
behaviour could not be held unlawful. The only point for determination was therefore 
if the defendant’s conduct was unlawful in the circumstances alleged by the plaintiff. 
In order to arrive at a determination whether the defendant bore a duty not to act 
negligently, the court was required to exercise a value judgment involving all policy 
considerations.248 The court’s hands were tied by the fact that the matter was 
decided on an exception and could not therefore evaluate all the policy 
considerations. In conclusion, the court held that the Lex Aquilia does provide a 
remedy to the true owner of a lost or stolen cheque where the collecting bank 
negligently collected or dealt with the cheque. Whether or not a collecting bank was 
negligent in its duty of collecting a cheque is a matter of evidence, and the court 
could not make a finding one way or the other without hearing oral evidence.249 
4.2.2. The Common Law Obligation to Establish the Identity of a Customer 
Taking a cue from the Indac Electronics case and to settle the matter once and for 
all, the defendant in the KwaMashu case took up the challenge of presenting 
evidence to the effect that the duty sought to be imposed was too burdensome and 
the bank should not be held liable to the true owner of a cheque. The defendant 
wanted to test the waters with the case and therefore took the matter to trial.250 As 
                                                 
247 At 797A. 
248 At 797F. 
249 At 801A. 
250 The KwaMashu case is significant in that it was the first case where a collecting bank took up 
the challenge to present evidence that the duty sought to be imposed was too burdensome 
(see Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes 402). 
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most issues were agreed,251 the plaintiff led no evidence and the defendant called 
one witness who had vast experience in the banking world. After evaluating the 
evidence presented by the defendant, the court turned to deal with the steps the 
bank ought to take in order to discharge the duty of care.252 In order to discharge this 
duty, a bank must take certain reasonable, practical and affordable steps in order to 
prevent loss to the true owner of a cheque. The steps must obviously not break the 
bank’s back cost wise. Lofty standards should not be expected of the bank, the steps 
that the bank is expected to take must not divert it from its core business of banking. 
Finally, the steps must be workable. 
Since a crossed cheque cannot be paid over the counter, the thief is obviously 
confronted with the harsh reality that he has to open a bank account in order to have 
access to the proceeds of the stolen cheque. Being a crafty person, the thief will then 
                                                 
251 The following issues relevant to this dissertation were agreed between the parties: 
a. At all times material hereto OK Bazaars (1929) Ltd (hereinafter referred to as 'the OK') a duly 
incorporated and registered company, had in terms of a partly oral and partly written 
agreement between it and the defendant, kept and operated a current banking account at the 
Eloff Street branch of the defendant. During 1990 the OK properly drew two cheques on the 
defendant, sufficient funds being available to meet the same. Particulars of the said cheques 
are as follows: 
i. Cheque A - dated 26 November 1990, drawn in favour of the plaintiff for an amount of  
R14 219,45 and which cheque was on the face of it made payable to 'KwaMashu Bakery 
Ltd only' and marked in bold across the middle of the cheque and running vertically 
upwards in capital letters the words 'not transferable'. 
ii. Cheque B - dated 27 December 1990, drawn in favour of the plaintiff for an amount of R18 
176,23 and which cheque was on the face of it made payable to 'KwaMashu Bakery Ltd 
only' and marked in bold across the middle of the cheque and running vertically upwards in 
capital letters the words 'not   transferable'. 
b. During the period 26 November to 27 December 1990 two persons, namely D N Mthembu and 
P R Mayise or persons known by these names, stole the two cheques in question. 
c. On 3 December 1990 the aforesaid two persons opened an account at the defendant's Durban 
branch under the name and style of KwaMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club. 
d. On 5 December 1990 the defendant, at its ABC branch, collected cheque A for the credit of 
the aforesaid persons and caused the amount to be paid into the account conducted under the 
name and style of KwaMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club. 
      On 27 December 1990 the defendant, at its ABC branch, collected cheque B for the credit of the 
aforesaid persons and paid the amount into the account conducted under the name and style of 
KwaMashu Bakery Ltd Soccer Club (at 380C-J-381A-B). 
252 At 395H. 
 64 
 
open a bank account in a name that is strikingly similar to that of the payee of the 
cheque that he has stolen. What is the bank to do when confronted with these crafty 
and cunning individuals? The answer is provided by PC Combrink J in the 
KwaMashu case, where he held that: 
I think it could be expected of a reasonable banker to not only satisfy himself of the identity of 
a new client but also to gather sufficient information regarding such client to enable him to 
know whether the person is the person or entity which he, she or it purports to be. Checks 
could be made on places of employment, address given, whereabouts of next of kin, etc 
before accepting the person as a customer.253 
Essentially, what the court is saying above is that a bank is obliged to know its 
customers before transacting with them. The obligation to know one’s customer 
entails not only relying on the ipse dixit of a customer but the bank must take a step 
further and verify that the information that has been furnished to it is correct. The 
court in the KwaMashu case made it very clear that the identification and verification 
processes must be completed before the bank accepts anyone to its clientele. 
Requiring of banks to identify and verify the identity of their customers casts no 
onerous duty on the banks.254 Banks must accept that responsibility as part of their 
obligations as the only institutions allowed by statute to take deposits.255 
With a little prudence, the fraud in the KwaMashu case could have been uncovered 
at the stage when the account was opened. Two strangers, Mthembu and Mayise, 
walk into the bank to open an account not in their names but in the names of an 
artificial person. This action on its own is not a warning sign that the account may be 
used for criminal purposes. It is trite learning that a company acts through its agents 
                                                 
253 At 396.  The court adopted a two-pronged approach, i.e. the identification and verification 
approach that was later prescribed in section 21 of FICA. These measures are affordable as 
they will not make any visible dent on the financial resources of the bank. 
254 At 396. The court referred to Ladbroke & Company v Todd [1914] 111 LT 43. In Ladbroke, His 
Lordship Bailhache had held that the bank was negligent because it did not make inquiries 
about a prospective customer, holding this as ordinary procedure followed by other banks 
before opening a bank account for a customer (see Hapgood Paget’s Law of Banking 85) 
255 At 394. 
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and if there is a need for the company to open a bank account it is its agents who will 
do the needful. What is surprising in the KwaMashu case is that no constituent 
documents were requested in relation to ‘KwaMashu Bakery Soccer Ltd’.256 The 
bank adopted a lackadaisical approach in the opening of the KwaMashu Bakery 
Soccer Ltd account, no documents were requested from the agents of the company, 
i.e, the constitution of the company, the memorandum of association, names, 
addresses and other details of executives and  the company resolution to open a 
bank account. It would have been a simple task to obtain such details, and had they 
been obtained the loss would not have been suffered.257 
A person who hands a cheque for collection has got two options: to hand it over the 
counter or to deposit it through an automatic teller machine. Where the first option is 
utilised, the customer fills in a deposit slip. The deposit slip will always have a space 
for the name of the account holder and the account number. The completed deposit 
slip and the cheque that is due for collection are then handed over to the teller, who 
has to verify that the name of the payee corresponds with the name of the account 
holder in all respects. It is also the responsibility of the teller to ascertain that there is 
no variation between the original deposit slip and the duplicate.258 The teller 
occupies a very special and important position in the bank in that she is the first point 
of contact for a thief who hands in a cheque for collection. Despite the fact that they 
occupy the bottom rung of the bank’s hierarchy, both in education and seniority,259 it 
                                                 
256 This was contrary to the standard banking practice of taking reasonable steps to ascertain the 
identity of a client. See Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory Notes 406. 
257 At 395J-396A. 
258 At 382E. 
259 At 392B it was held that ‘tellers, so the evidence went, are one step above the lowest level of 
skilled employees in the bank and they certainly do not have the skill suggested by the 
Appellate Division’. The Appellate Division that was referred to was Indac Electronics supra at 
799, where it was held that 'The collecting banker, by virtue of his calling, possesses or 
professes to possess special skill and competence in his field and can, or ought to, appreciate 
the significance of instructions upon a cheque.' It was further submitted before the court that 
depositors are notorious for inaccurately describing themselves on deposit slips and thereby 
making the tellers’ jobs even more difficult. At 392B-E. 
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is not asking too much of them to require that before they collect a cheque for 
payment they must ensure that the names of the payee correspond with the names 
of the account holder into which the cheque is being deposited. A problem arises 
where inaccurate or insufficient information was provided at the account opening 
stage, with the result that an account is held under false or misleading names. In that 
case, if a teller collects a cheque for a person who is not entitled thereto on the basis 
of inaccurate information that was provided at the account opening stage, it cannot 
be said that the teller abdicated her responsibilities. It is not only advisable but 
imperative to always confirm that the presenter of a cheque is the true owner. The 
argument that it is a humongous task to check every cheque that is presented for 
collection is untenable.260 
The defendant sought to convince the court, in the light of the evidence it had led, 
that the policy considerations espoused by the court in the Indac Electronics261 case 
should not be upheld, and further that the legal convictions of the community 
required that the bank should not be held liable for negligently dealing with a 
cheque.262 The defendant argued that the requirement that it has to make sure that it 
collects on behalf of the true owner will simply bring the one day clearance to a stop. 
The one day clearance is not cast in stone and the period can easily be extended 
without any disruption to the clearance system.263 The court was not persuaded by 
this argument and held that the evidence presented by the defendant that was 
                                                 
260 The defendant, from page 387A-J to 388A-J, had quoted quite impressive statistics in an 
effort to demonstrate that it was simply impossible to scrutinise every cheque that is 
presented for collection. As is the norm with statistics, numbers can be manipulated for 
whatever end and the court held, at 388, that ‘what the defendant and the other banks were 
unable to do was to provide some empirical basis upon which to gauge the actual risk to 
which the banks are exposed’. 
261 At 798D-799J. 
262 At 390H. 
263 At 395F. 
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intended to negative the prima facie duty of care set out in the Indac Electronics 
case actually dealt with the standard of care.264  
In the final analysis, the court held that the bank had failed to take any precautions in 
opening an account for the two thieves, that the said conduct caused the plaintiff to 
sustain a loss, and judgment was accordingly granted as prayed for by the 
plaintiff.265 The KwaMashu decision is significant in that for the first time a South 
African court laid down, even though without going into much detail, what a KYC 
programme must entail. 
4.2.3. Information Concerning Existing Clients 
In the matter of Powell and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank266 the court 
was confronted with a case of a cheque fraudulently paid into an account opened in 
the same name as the payee of the cheque. The brief facts of the case were as 
follows: the plaintiff carried on business as a dealer of used vehicles and sought to 
obtain used Volkswagen vehicles. Unfortunately for the plaintiff, Volkswagen sold its 
used vehicles to certain specified persons only, and the plaintiff was not one of them. 
In order to overcome this obstacle, the plaintiff approached one Gerber who was 
employed as a test driver by Volkswagen. Gerber assured the plaintiff that he could 
procure certain used Volkswagen vehicles for him. The plaintiff instructed his bank, 
Nedbank, to issue four cheques in favour of Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. The 
                                                 
264 At 392I. 
265 At 397F-I. The court found that the defendant had received payment on behalf of persons 
who had no entitlement thereto, and that in so doing it had acted negligently. The bank was 
also found to have acted negligently by collecting cheques which were made out to a limited 
liability company into the account of individuals or association of individuals. In one of the 
cheques, the bank proceeded to pay even though the name of the account holder as stated 
on the deposit slip differed from that of the named payee ex facie the cheque. 
266 1998 (2) SA 807 (SE) (hereinafter the Powell case). 
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four cheques were collected by Gerber from Nedbank and he deposited them with 
his bank, Volkskas Bank.267 
On the 1st December 1994 Gerber had made an application to open a bank account 
under the name and style Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. The savings account 
was duly opened and the four cheques from Powell were deposited into the said 
bank account on the same day.268 The plaintiff made a number of averments at 
paragraphs 7-11.10 of its particulars of claim.269 The Defendant admitted that Gerber 
deposited the cheques in his bank account which he opened under the trading name 
of Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales, and further that the defendant acted as Gerber’s 
collecting bank. The defendant, as was to be expected, denied that the cheques 
were unlawfully misappropriated by Gerber, that Powell was the true owner of the 
cheques, and further that Gerber had no title to the cheques.270 
For the defendant, it was testified by Kinghorn that he had known Gerber as a client 
from about 1991, that Gerber was a test driver, and that he bought and sold vehicles. 
On the 1st December 1994, when the account had been opened, Gerber had told the 
witness that he was going to trade as Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. The payee 
on the cheques was Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales and the name of the account 
holder into which the cheques had been deposited corresponded with that of the 
payee. At the account opening stage the following checks were made: Kinghorn 
consulted the telephone directory to ascertain whether there was an entry for 
Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. No such entry was found. A credit check did not 
yield any adverse information against the applicant.271 It is illuminating to note that 
                                                 
267 The background of the case is laid down from 809E-J-811A-H. 
268 At 811B-C. 
269 At 811I-J-813A-I. 
270 At 814C. 
271 At 814H. 
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no documents whatsoever were requested in connection with the relationship 
between Gerber and Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. 
It was alleged by the plaintiff that the defendant was negligent in opening a bank 
account for Gerber under the trading name of Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales.272 It 
goes without saying that bankers are professionals who are in the business of 
rendering professional banking services.273 It was held in Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v 
Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd,274 that: ‘the collecting banker is the only one who 
is in a position to know whether or not the cheque is being collected on behalf of the 
person who is entitled to receive payment’. 
 It is submitted that the collecting bank can have the information alluded to in the 
Rhostar case only if enough and accurate information was collected during the 
account opening stage to enable the bank to know the person it was dealing with 
and the person it would be dealing with in the future. Did the bank take any steps to 
try to establish and verify the identity of the person it was dealing with? I submit to 
the contrary. It is in evidence that the only steps taken by the bank, and we do not 
know what they sought to achieve, was to consult the telephone directory and 
conduct a credit check on Mr. Gerber. 
                                                 
272 The allegations are listed at pages 817H-J-818A-D chief among them being that: 
a. Kinghorn simply accepted Gerber's word for the fact that he was the owner of a business known 
as Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales. He failed to carry out any independent enquiry or 
investigation apart from establishing that no existing business with that name was listed in the 
telephone directory; 
b. it was obvious from the application to open the account that Gerber had no business address and 
that he was apparently carrying on business from his home; 
c. it should have been apparent to Kinghorn that a motor dealer required a cheque account to 
enable him to carry on business and that the 'Maxi Save' account which Gerber had opened was 
wholly inappropriate for this type of trade; and 
d. the name 'Volkswagen' is a well-known trade name or business name and it was unlikely that 
Gerber would have had the right to use that name for his own business. 
273 This point was driven home in Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor 
Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1985 (4) SA 553 (ZS) at 565. 
274 1972 (2) SA 703 (R) at 715-716 (hereinafter the Rhostar case). 
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Notwithstanding what was said in the Kwamashu case,275 the bank failed to conduct 
a due diligence on Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales before opening the bank 
account. The court sought to distinguish the KwaMashu case and the case before it 
on the basis that in KwaMashu the applicant was a stranger to the bank while in the 
Powell case the bank was dealing with a familiar face.276 I am unable to agree with 
the court’s reasoning for the following reason: the applicant for a bank account in 
Powell was not Gerber. The account holder was Gerber trading as Volkswagen Used 
Vehicle Sales. For all intents and purposes, the account holder was Volkswagen 
Used Vehicle Sales. With the greatest respect, Gerber’s trading name was an 
‘unknown quantity’ at the defendant bank. It should be borne in mind that Gerber, 
even though he was a client at the defendant bank, did not seek to open an 
additional bank account. What he sought to do was to open an account under a 
trading name, an assumed name if I may. It is my submission that the bank was duty 
bound to collect as much information as possible from Gerber about his ‘assumed 
name’ to enable the defendant to know exactly what type of entity Volkswagen Used 
Vehicle Sales was. It was not enough for the defendant to have relied on its 
knowledge of the person behind the entity to come to the conclusion that the entity 
was worthy to deal with. It is my submission that had the bank requested for 
documentary proof of Gerber’s right to use the name Volkswagen Used Vehicle 
Sales, Gerber’s intended fraud of Mr. Powell would have been easily detected and 
averted.  
However, the distinction between the sort of enquiries made in respect of new and 
existing customers is totally on point. Assuming that all the necessary information 
had been collected when the first account was opened, it would have been a 
tautological exercise to request for the very same information when a successive 
account was being opened. The ever present danger with this approach is that 
information may become outdated. For instance, people change their addresses and 
                                                 
275 At 395I/J-396A-B. 
276 At 820F-I. 
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places of employment and identity documents have got a validity period. As was 
demonstrated in this case, sometimes people change their names to suit certain 
purposes. It is not enough for a bank to rely on the probity of its client to inform it that 
the information in its possession is outdated. It is submitted that, even though it may 
look like a futile exercise, it is advisable that at the barest minimum a client should be 
asked to confirm the validity of the information in the bank’s possession. I am in 
respectful disagreement with the learned judge277 when he held, to paraphrase, that 
‘I am not prepared to hold that Kinghorn should not have accepted the word of a 
customer and that he should have carried out an independent enquiry’. The court’s 
reasoning, with respect, is unsupportable. That Gerber had always been honest in 
his dealings with the bank is neither here nor there. An independent enquiry was 
clearly indicated where someone who had been a client for about three years 
suddenly wanted to trade under a name strikingly similar to that of his employer. 
The court rejected, rightly so in my view, the plaintiff’s argument that the defendant’s 
suspicion must have been aroused when it was discovered that Gerber was 
conducting his business from home.278 It is common for many start-up businesses to 
operate from home. For all it is worth, Gerber’s business could have been operating 
from a commercial area and this on its own would not have prevented the plaintiff’s 
loss. The plaintiff’s loss was not occasioned by the location of the business. The 
argument that the type of account that was opened was unsuitable for the type of 
business that Gerber was engaged in and ought to have raised suspicion was also 
rejected.279 The court, with respect, misdirected itself by rejecting this argument. A 
savings account is just that - an account where one saves money. It is common 
sense that the same cannot be used to conduct business transactions, i.e. regular 
                                                 
277 At 821A-D. 
278 At 821I. 
279 Still at 821I-J. 
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deposits and withdrawals.280 The chosen type of account was therefore suspicious. 
However, it is my submission that had the defendant alerted Gerber about the 
unsuitability of his chosen type of account, Gerber could then have chosen an 
appropriate bank account, i.e. a cheque account, and the loss would have occurred 
anyway. It was not demonstrated that the requirements to open a cheque account 
are more onerous than those to open a savings account or, to take the argument to 
the extreme, that it is easier to commit fraud with a savings account than with a 
cheque account. The bank can be faulted only for allowing Gerber to open a bank 
account under a trading name similar not only to that of a well-known brand but also 
to his employer’s. Both facts were known to the defendant at the time and it chose to 
close its eyes to the facts and proceeded to open the account. It seems that Gerber’s 
bona fides during the years that he operated an account with the defendant weighed 
rather too heavily in his favour, to the point that the bank failed to make enquiries 
where an enquiry was clearly called for. 
4.2.4. Opening Accounts for Franchises 
From time to time banks will have to deal with clients who are so cunning that even 
with the benefit of hindsight no amount of probing would have uncovered their fraud. 
The Columbus Joint Venture case is a classical case in point. It is said that a leopard 
never loses its spots. Mr. Bertolis was removed from the roll of attorneys in 1985. In 
1992, Bertolis was employed by the plaintiff as a group legal adviser without his 
revealing the fact of his removal from the roll. Bertolis opened an account with the 
defendant not in his own name but under the trading name of Stanbrooke & Hooper. 
At the time that the Stanbrooke & Hooper account was opened, Bertolis already had 
two bank accounts with the defendant. Even though the Stanbrooke account was 
                                                 
280 The plaintiff’s other arguments were rejected at 822B-J. The fact that Gerber earned a certain 
income at the time that he opened a bank account for Volkswagen Used Vehicle Sales was 
immaterial. It is not given that since someone has been earning a certain income he does not 
have the capacity to generate more than he has been earning. Even though it was not stated 
in so many words, the plaintiff’s argument boiled down to this: the bank’s suspicion should 
have been aroused when a man who had been earning R48 000.00 per annum presented the 
bank with cheques amounting to more than R100 000.00. 
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opened at a branch different from those where Bertolis already had his bank 
accounts, it was common cause between the parties that it was always known that 
Bertolis was a customer of the defendant. 
In furtherance of his fraudulent enterprise, Bertolis presented to the defendant with a 
well prepared franchise agreement between himself and Messrs Stanbrooke & 
Hooper, a firm of solicitors in far-away Belgium dealing in European community 
law.281 On the face of it, there was nothing untoward with the franchise agreement. 
Between 1993 and 1996 Bertolis’ creation, Stanbrooke & Hooper, billed the plaintiff 
R777 302, 40 for legal services purportedly rendered to the plaintiff.282 All payments 
to Bertolis, through Stanbrooke & Hooper, were effected by way of crossed cheques. 
The cheques were presented to the defendant for collection either by Bertolis himself 
or one of the defendant’s employees at the instruction of Bertolis. 
The court was asked if the defendant acted unlawfully and negligently in opening a 
bank account and subsequently collecting the cheques in the circumstances 
enunciated in the stated case by: (1) failing to make enquiries with Stanbrooke & 
Hooper (Brussels) as to the existence of a franchise agreement between it and 
Bertolis, (2) failing to verify the existence of a firm by the name of Stanbrooke & 
Hooper (3) failing to enquire from the defendant’s in-house attorneys as to whether it 
was possible for one to practise law in the manner that Bertolis sought to do, and (4) 
failing to enquire as to whether in fact and indeed a business by the name of 
Stanbrooke & Hooper was operating in South Africa.283  
After traversing decisions that dealt with the duty of care, the court held that in the 
case before it, it had to determine the content of the duty of care and the obligations 
                                                 
281 Even though the nature of the business that the plaintiff carried out is not stated in the 
judgment, I have serious doubts that it carried on business that would require advice from a 
firm specialising in European community law. 
282 In actual fact Stanbrooke & Hooper never rendered any legal services to the plaintiff. 
283 At 500G-I. 
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of a bank when opening a bank account.284 When dealing with the obligations of a 
bank when opening a bank account, the court proceeded thus: 
A bank opening an account for a customer would by the very nature of the relationship make 
inquiries concerning the customer, his status (ie whether a single or married person, whether 
a company or partnership or other entity), his home and work, his telephone numbers, the 
authority of signatories, etc. The purpose of these inquiries would primarily be to ascertain the 
trustworthiness or standing of the customer so as to prevent loss to the bank and, generally, 
to ensure that the customer conducts his account regularly and according to set principles. A 
credit risk may also be involved where the bank extends credit to the customer. In such a 
case particulars of the customer's income, place and duration of employment, qualifications, 
etc may be relevant. The two inquiries may overlap.285 
Even though the gathering of the information mentioned above cannot guarantee the 
trustworthiness of a client, it is submitted that such information will give the bank a 
general idea of the person that it is dealing with. However, it must be borne in mind 
that, more often than not, criminals will have ready answers to questions that may 
arise. The requirement that the applicant for a bank account disclose his home and 
work addresses will come in handy where a claim is made against the bank and the 
thief has to be followed up. Without a work or home address it will be almost 
impossible, barring substituted service, to serve court processes on the thief. Turning 
to the questions that were posed to it, the court held that the enquiries to New 
Zealand as to the existence or otherwise of Stanbrooke & Hooper would have 
revealed little or nothing at all.286 It was agreed between the parties that such a firm 
existed and it is submitted, as the court also held, that calling Brussels would have 
been tautological. Of course it was not known to the bank at the time that the 
account was opened that such a firm existed in Brussels. However, as pointed out 
earlier, the failure to obtain this information could not have altered the course of 
events. 
                                                 
284 At 500J-510B. 
285 At 502I/J-503A. 
286 At 511B. 
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When dealing with the plaintiff’s second ground of negligence, Malan J. held that 
there was nothing untoward with the franchise agreement that could have 
necessitated a call to the purported franchisee to confirm that indeed a franchise 
agreement had been entered into with Bertolis.287 Requiring the bank to make the 
telephone call, reasoned the court, would have been asking for too much from the 
bank. Even though I fully agree with the reasoning of the court that there was nothing 
which called for enquiries about the franchise agreement, if the bank had made the 
call ex abundant cautella, the fraud could have been thwarted at that stage. 
Alternatively, the bank could have written to Messrs Stanbrooke & Hooper (Brussels) 
asking them to confirm that indeed they had entered into a franchise agreement with 
one Mr. Bertolis. As much as the court absolved the defendant on this ground, that 
was done with a caveat. Misuse may be indicated where a customer seeks to open a 
bank account in a name other than his or hers. This ‘anomaly’, applying for a bank 
account in a name other than one’s own, is fully explained where a regular franchise 
agreement is presented to the bank. The bank is not required to assume the role of 
an amateur detective by cross-examining a client as to the veracity of the information 
that s/he supplies to the bank where the facts before it do not call for such a cross 
examination. The court held that the bank is entitled to rely on the information that is 
supplied to it by a customer. 
The last two grounds of negligence were also rejected by the court. Failure by the 
defendant to ascertain from its attorneys whether it was competent to practise law in 
the manner that Bertolis sought to do could not have changed anything. It was not 
alleged or proved that the defendant’s attorneys would have advised that the 
proposed manner of practising law by Bertolis was illegal. Negligence was therefore 
not proved on this ground. The bank was not even required to establish the 
existence or otherwise of Stanbrooke & Hooper in South Africa.288 The franchise 
                                                 
287 At 511D. 
288 At 511I/J-512A. 
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agreement sufficed as evidence of the existence of Stanbrooke & Hooper in South 
Africa. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the bank account was opened with a clear intention to 
defraud the plaintiff. The question then is how the fraud could have been prevented. 
It must be borne in mind that Bertolis did not just walk into the bank off the street and 
ask that an account be opened for him. He was already a customer of the bank and 
there had been no complaint about the way he conducted his two accounts with the 
defendant. That, coupled with the fact he was supposedly a member of the noble 
profession, would not have put any reasonable banker on enquiry.289 Attorneys are 
well known for their integrity and honesty. So cunning, so meticulously prepared was 
Bertolis’ fraud that no reasonable banker could have done anything to thwart it. The 
fraud could have been prevented, I suggest, by the plaintiff only through its internal 
payment controls. 
4.2.5. CDD for a Client with no Banking History 
The decision in the Energy Measurements case developed the two-pronged 
approach to customer identification which is now contained in section 21 of FICA. In 
accepting a customer to its clientele, a bank is duty bound not only to identify the 
applicant for a bank account but must take a step further and verify the identity of the 
customer. In a well thought out fraud, Wayne approached the defendant bank with a 
request that a bank account be opened for him. The bank account was to be opened 
for Tradefast 8, trading as Energy Measurements, a company in which he was the 
sole director, shareholder and authorised signatory. All the necessary documents290 
                                                 
289 It actually turned out that he had been given a dishonourable discharge from the profession, 
i.e. he had been struck off from the roll of attorneys. 
290 The following documents were provided: a certified copy of Mr Wayne’s identity document, at 
150E, notarially certified copies of the following documents were provided in respect of 
Tradefast 8: a certificate of incorporation, a memorandum of association, articles of 
association, notice of registered office and postal address, a certificate to commence 
business, the resignation of Dennis Jacobus Bishop as a director of Tradefast 8, a securities 
transfer form from Dennis Jacobus Bishop to Eugene Wayne, a resolution of the subscribers 
to the memorandum and articles of association appointing Eugene Wayne as director and 
placing 100 shares in his name. At 152J-153D. Mr. Bishop, it was testified by Mr. Helberg, an 
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were made available to the bank, and an impressive income projection was provided 
even though it was not required by the bank. His lack of a banking history was easily 
explained away by his tall tale that he had been away in the United States of 
America in the three years preceding his application for a bank account.291 By and 
large, the bank was given all it required to open a bank account. 
A Mr Walter McKittrick, in charge of the Fraud Investigation Unit of the defendant, 
was subpoenaed by the plaintiff to testify. He testified that the defendant has a 
standing instruction to its members of staff not to open an account where they 
suspect that it may be employed for fraudulent purposes. A prospective client must 
be questioned to establish the correctness of the information that he has provided. 
The account must not be opened where the answers are unsatisfactory. 
Alternatively, the application must be referred to a senior bank official.292 But it is 
submitted that criminals are devious by nature. They may supply all the documents 
required, as Wayne did. They are unlikely to state their real intention in opening a 
bank account. A blunt question like ‘Do you intend to use this account for fraudulent 
purposes?’ will be met with a definite No! It cannot be expected of a bank to go into 
the mind of each and every applicant for a bank account and extract therefrom the 
real intention behind the opening of the account. These thoughts not be construed as 
advocating for the relaxation of the safeguards that a bank must put in place to 
detect fraud committed through a bank account. The point that is being driven home 
here is that fraudsters are usually elaborate and sophisticated criminals. They are 
not your average pickpockets. 
                                                                                                                                                        
employee of the Registrar of Companies, at 145I-J, that he was in the business of registering 
and selling shelf companies. 
291 It was in evidence at page 152C-D that during the time that he alleges he was in the USA he 
actually resided at the following addresses: 3 July 1997: 21 Roeland Street, Cape Town, 28 
November 1995:402 Monterey, Bay Road, Mouille Point, Cape Town and 20 January 1995:22 
Kassies Court, Forrest Hill Avenue, Vredehoek, Cape Town. The information was obtained 
from the credit check that was conducted on him, which further revealed that on 21 February 
1995 he was employed by Wayne Motors. 
292 At 146D-E. 
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According to McKittrick, where an explanation is called for in the case of suspected 
fraud the bank relies on the ipse dixit of the client, as the bank-client relationship is 
founded on trust. If a client gives a reasonable explanation, the bank must trust the 
client and accept the explanation, testified McKittrick. He was of the view that the 
bank does not have an obligation to verify the information supplied to it by a client. It 
accepts what the client says as the gospel truth. Where a bank account is sought to 
be opened for a company, the bank’s main concern is whether the signatories have 
been properly mandated by the company. The bank confirms the company’s 
existence through the documents supplied to it. In the normal course of events, the 
bank will not seek to verify the information supplied to it by contacting third parties or 
independent sources. In a rather chilling manner, McKittrick ‘emphasised that the 
first obligation of the bank is to ensure that it does not suffer any losses’.293 It is my 
submission that McKittrick’s evidence dealt a death blow to the defendant’s case. He 
was of the view that the duty cast upon collecting banks by the KwaMashu294 case 
was too theoretical, as fraudsters always cover their backs by hiring offices with 
telephones and rendering any check conducted by the banks totally ineffectual, as 
another fraudster will be waiting on the other end of the line to feed the bank 
whatever information the bank seeks to establish. I submit that this witness’ 
reasoning was at variance with logic in that not all fraudsters have the kind of 
sophistry that he testified to. It does not hurt to try, and it is always worthwhile for a 
bank to independently verify the information given to it by an applicant for a bank 
account. 
The banking industry suffers from sustained attacks from fraudsters.295 In this wave 
of attacks, banks ought to be vigilant in the way they conduct business and must 
apply a thorough selection process to determine who does and who does not 
become a client. If a lackadaisical approach, as advocated for by McKittrick, is 
                                                 
293 At 147H. 
294 At 395I – 396D. 
295 At 148B. 
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allowed to take root, then criminals can rest assured that they have unrestricted 
access to the banking system and depositors’ funds. This, I submit, is not the course 
that we wish our banking industry to take. In contrast to McKittrick, the plaintiff’s 
expert witness, Retief, testified that at Standard bank branches are warned to be 
thorough when opening bank accounts and always to be mindful of the fact that the 
use of trading names is the criminals’ preferred modus operandi in furthering their 
fraudulent activities. A bank, according to Retief, ought not to be myopic and only 
rely on the documents provided by the client, but must independently conduct a 
verification exercise. In their zeal to deny criminals access to banking facilities, 
banks are not required to smell a rotten egg where there is none. Not all applicants 
for a bank account are criminals. However, it must always be borne in mind that a 
criminal will emerge from time to time and pollute the banking system, if given a 
chance.  
Retief confessed that there is fierce competition amongst banks for new business, 
including the opening of new bank accounts.296 However, the competition that 
prevails amongst banks should not be used as an excuse to allow criminals to 
infiltrate the banking system. Checks and balances must be retained to ensure that 
the drive to stay competitive does not lead to a free-for-all situation where all and 
sundry are granted access to a bank account. Banks must not be fearful that if they 
ask incisive questions the prospective client will simply walk away to another bank 
willing to see no evil and hear no evil. It was postulated by Retief that some 
enquiries, probably the ones deemed offensive, can be made after the client has left 
the bank but before the account becomes operational. 
Anderson, for the defendant, testified that three steps are followed before a bank 
account is opened.297 It is striking that in those three steps there is no provision for 
                                                 
296 At 148G-H. 
297 At 149H-I. The three steps are as follows (1) the client is interviewed and asked to fill out an 
application form; (2) the necessary documents are collected and the applicant’s credit history 
is obtained; and (3)  all the documents are then sent to a manager, who has the final say as 
to whether an account is to be opened or not. 
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the verification of the information provided. It seems that the bank is concerned only 
with whether the applicant has an unblemished credit history. It is strange that a 
bank should be more concerned about the applicant’s credit history than with if the 
client is who s/he says s/he is. Perhaps the infatuation with the applicant’s history is 
explained by McKittrick, who had testified that the bank is concerned only with 
cushioning itself against loss. It follows, as day follows night, that where an applicant 
has a bad credit record, the bank would be likely to suffer a loss were it to lend 
him/her money during the relationship. Hence the insistence on a clean credit history 
above all else. 
The court considered that the real point for determination was whether or not the 
legal duty on the part of a collecting banker to prevent loss to the true owner of a lost 
or stolen cheque extends to the opening of a bank account.298 It goes without saying 
that in order to reap the benefits of a crossed and marked not negotiable cheque the 
thief will need a bank account, as such a cheque is not payable over the counter. It 
also follows that in opening a bank account, a bank ought to be alive to the real 
likelihood that the account that is being opened may be used to access the proceeds 
of a lost or stolen cheque. Despite a bank’s business imperative to open as many 
accounts as possible, the court held that the bank is at liberty to take as much time 
as it needs to decide whether an account ought to be opened or not.299 The business 
imperative alluded to above does not override the bank’s responsibility to ensure that 
it opens an account only after ascertaining that the applicant is who s/he says s/he 
is. It is obviously up to the bank to decide whether to be cautious in considering the 
application before it or to adopt a more ‘business like’ approach and suffer the 
consequences of opening a bank account which it should not have opened in the 
first place. A bank is in the business of making profit but also needs to prevent 
losses to the true owners of lost or stolen cheques, and it is my submission that a 
balance can be struck between the profit motive and the duty of care. 
                                                 
298 At 158H. 
299 At 160C-D. 
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It is not an option for a bank to say that applying its mind to the application to open a 
bank account will be time consuming and expensive, as both the cost and time for 
doing such are negligible. No evidence was led in connection with the time and cost 
involved in carrying out a customer due diligence before an account is opened, and 
the court was at large to make the finding that it made regarding the same. 
The point cannot be sufficiently reiterated: a bank has a duty to establish the identity 
of its customer and to obtain information which can point to the bona fides of a new 
customer. Ascertaining the identity of a new customer does not only entail perusing 
the documents that have been supplied. It goes much further than that. The bank 
has to obtain independent verification of the information supplied. The verification of 
the client’s identity and the obtaining of information establishing the bona fides of a 
prospective client must be carried out despite the fact that fraudsters constitute a tiny 
minority of the bank’s clientele. 
The defendant argued strenuously that it did all that was expected of it before the 
Tradefast 8 account was opened. It was enough, so the argument went, that the 
originals of the company’s constituent documents were requested and furnished, that 
the resolution of the directors authorising the opening of the account and the 
specimen of the signatures of the authorised signatories to the account were 
supplied. Over and above that, the applicant provided a copy of his identity 
document, a credit check on both the company and the director was conducted, and 
no adverse information either against the company or the director was discovered.300   
Prima facie, the argument looks persuasive. However, there are inherent flaws with 
the defendant’s argument, because what the defendant is actually advocating for is 
an ‘anything goes’ scenario whereby any document purporting to be something is 
                                                 
300 At 164D-H. The bank further argued that once all the listed documents had been obtained it 
owed no further duty, as the existence of the company and the identity of the director and 
signatory had been positively established. It was the defendant’s argument that a mere 
perusal of the documents was enough, as scrutinising the same more particularly would have 
amounted to the bank officials assuming the role of amateur detectives, which they were not. 
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accepted without question. The argument leads to the inevitable conclusion that 
fraudulent documents will be accepted without hesitation, thereby rendering the 
customer due diligence process nugatory. 
Alive to the danger of judging matters with the benefit of hindsight, which is always 
perfect, the court held that the bank had been negligent in opening the Tradefast 8 
account. Even though the court was correct in its findings, I submit that in some 
instances it overreached itself in reaching those findings. It is correct that 
independent references must be obtained. However, it is taking it a bit too far to hold, 
as the court did, that the knowledge that references will be obtained will dissuade 
fraudsters from setting up offices with telephones. The fraudsters set up offices 
precisely for that reason; in case the information that they have provided is followed 
up. Why would they go to the trouble of setting up offices if they knew that nobody 
was going to call their offices? Having said that, following up independent and 
verifiable references does not only entail calling the fraudster’s office. Other sources 
of information can be called to verify the information that has been provided not only 
by a fraudster but by any other applicant for a bank account. Even this, I submit, will 
not dissuade criminals from setting up their fraudulent schemes. Criminals are well 
known for taking chances. They will still embark on a criminal enterprise with the full 
knowledge that they may get caught. 
The view that asking intrusive but necessary questions may turn away potential 
clients is untenable. Wayne, by his own admission, was a stranger to the banking 
world. It was to be expected that he be subjected to thorough questioning before he 
could be accepted into the banking domain. ‘Requiring trade and other references is 
a common business practice and no justification exists to exempt banks from such a 
duty’.301 Any bank must be wary of a man who gets offended by the request to 
provide trade and other references. There is nothing intrusive or offensive about 
such a request. Obtaining references constitutes part of the KYC programme and 
there is no justification for banks to exempt themselves from such a minimal and 
                                                 
301 At 165I-J. 
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simple duty. The superficial interview conducted by the bank official was totally 
unhelpful, as it did not reveal anything worthy of note. 
In the information provided to the bank, Wayne had stated that he had a financial 
obligation by way of a leased vehicle. He did not state whether the vehicle was 
leased from a financial institution or some other entity. The fact of the existence of a 
lease agreement provided the bank with a trade reference lead. This lead was not 
followed. At a minimum the details of the lease should have been obtained with a 
view to obtaining a financial history of Tradefast 8. Information was placed before the 
bank and it failed to act up on it. Further, the credit check belied the applicant’s 
explanation for a lack of a banking history. It was discovered during the credit history 
check that during the time that Wayne was allegedly in the United States of America, 
he was at the same time incurring debts in South Africa or at the very least applying 
for credit facilities. This should have alerted the bank to the fact that something was 
amiss with the application. The credit check further revealed that at one point Wayne 
had been employed by ‘Wayne Motors’. Had the applicant been asked about his 
employment at Wayne Motors, information could have come to light as to how he 
was receiving his salary, i.e. whether through a bank account or via a cheque. In 
addition, the whereabouts of Wayne Motors should have been established. The bank 
acted negligently by failing to make further enquiries in the face of these 
contradictions. Wayne had also stated that at the time of the application he had 
already generated some business. This lead ought to have been followed. However, 
there was no better lead than the cheque that was to be deposited. The drawer could 
have been contacted and Wayne’s fraud would have been discovered there and 
then. 
4.3. Conclusion 
The cases discussed above bear testimony to the courts’ track record in recognising 
the need to have measures in place to identify and verify the identity of potential 
customers. The stage for such recognition was set by the decision in the Indac 
Electronics case, where it was held that there was no impediment to the recognition 
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of a collecting bank’s liability in negligently paying the proceeds of a lost or stolen 
cheque. 
Thereafter followed the decision in the KwaMashu case, where the steps that ought 
to be followed in opening a bank account were summarily laid down and the duty of 
a bank to identify and verify the identity of its potential customer was emphasised. It 
has become clear in this chapter that thieves will always find a way through the 
system. Implementing the KYC programme as developed by the courts would be 
helpful but not fool proof, as demonstrated by Wayne and Gerber.302   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
302 See the cases of Powell and Another and Energy Measurements respectively. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1. Conclusion 
It has always been imperative that there be a law pertaining to the supervision of 
banks as regards the admission of new clients. KYC is a direct product of the fight 
against money laundering. The international community, through the FATF and the 
Basel Committee, has for a long time been aware of the danger of criminals 
employing the banking system for their nefarious ends. Awareness on its own is not 
enough. It was therefore apt that the international community developed the KYC 
standards. The development of these standards in itself could not prevent criminals 
from employing the banking system for their criminal purposes. It was therefore 
crucial that mechanisms be put in place for the implementation of the KYC standards 
developed by the international community. 
Locally, the implementation of the KYC standards was not achieved overnight. The 
process of implementation was kick-started by the publication of a discussion paper 
by the SALC in 1996, which accepted that the introduction of a legislative scheme 
which espouses regulatory measures is an antecedent step in the fight against 
money laundering. A Money Laundering Control Bill was published together with the 
discussion paper. The SALC emphasised the crucial importance of the need to 
establish and verify the identity of a potential customer. 
The Money Laundering Control Bill was never implemented. The government 
appointed another task force to advise it on the suitability of the Money Laundering 
Control Bill. The outcome of the deliberations of the task force was a Financial 
Intelligence Bill which gave birth to FICA. Section 21 of FICA is the epicentre of the 
CDD concept. It enjoins a bank to take certain steps to establish and verify the 
identity of a potential customer before it establishes or concludes a business 
relationship with the said person. In establishing and verifying the identity of a 
potential customer a bank is obliged to adopt a risk-based approach. The FIC has 
issued Guidance Notes to assist banks to comply with the risk-based approach. 
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The South African KYC regime is based not only on the legislation. In fact, well 
before the introduction of FICA the courts recognised the logic of establishing 
whether the customer is the person who s/he says s/he is. The Court in the 
Yorkshire Insurance case was against the recognition of the liability of a collecting 
bank under the Lex Aquilia for pure economic loss to the true owner of a lost or 
stolen cheque. The Yorkshire Insurance case was considered a locus classicus until 
1992. Indac Electronics case departed from the Yorkshire Insurance decision in so 
far as it was held that there was no basis for not holding a collecting bank liable to 
the owner of a lost or stolen cheque. The court in the Indac Electronics case was 
driven to its conclusion by the observation, among others, that ‘if there were no legal 
duty to take reasonable care, it would mean that the collecting banker need not 
examine or even look at the cheque’. Having traversed a number of authorities, the 
court concluded that ‘there can be no reason in principle why a collecting banker 
should not be held liable under the extended Lex Aquilia for negligence to the true 
owner of a cheque’. 
The principle in the Indac Electronics case was expanded upon in KwaMashu, where 
it was held that a reasonable banker ought to identify and verify the identity of a 
potential client. It is my submission that the KwaMashu decision served as the 
genesis of the KYC regime in South Africa. It must be emphasised that the 
KwaMashu decision laid down only a rough basis for the adoption of the KYC regime 
in South Africa. The details omitted in the KwaMashu case were provided in the 
Columbus Joint Venture case. What comes out clearly from case law is that 
criminals are more often than not one step ahead of the banks. 
It was demonstrated in the Columbus Joint Venture case that it is almost impossible 
to prevent some type of fraud. In this case, the bank made all the enquiries that a 
reasonable banker would have made, but the fraud occurred nevertheless. The 
Columbus Joint Venture case demonstrated that there is always a lacuna in the law 
and that there is no law that is fool proof. 
The common law distinguishes between a situation where a bank account is opened 
for a new customer and a situation where a bank account is opened for an existing 
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customer. This distinction is significant in that the information that is to be collected 
and verified is not the same. Where a new customer requests to open a bank 
account, the bank is enjoined not only to apply its mind to the documentation placed 
before it by the customer but it must also verify the information placed before it.303 
This is in contrast to the steps that the bank has to take when it opens a bank 
account for an existing customer. An existing customer has a verified identity and 
known residential address.304 
5.2. Recommendations 
Two kinds of problem clients were identified in this dissertation, i.e., clients operating 
under trading names and those operating using a franchise. As indicated earlier, 
there is nothing inherently suspicious in opening a bank account using a trading 
name or as a franchise. It is wholly permissible to do that. However, it becomes a 
problem where either a franchise or a trading name is used as a vehicle to commit 
fraud. 
Three cases have been discussed in this dissertation pertaining to fraud committed 
under the guise of operating a franchise or operating under a trading name. The 
Business Names Act305 regulates the use of business names and matters incidental 
thereto. The Business Names Act prohibits the use of misleading or deceptive 
business names.306 The Business Names Act is in need of an overhaul to address its 
                                                 
303 The Columbus Joint Venture case at 97A-98E-F. 
304 The Columbus Joint Venture case at 97-98. 
305 27 of 1960.  
306 Section 5(1) of the Business Names Act provides thus: 
Upon the application in writing of any aggrieved person the Registrar may in writing order any 
person who carries on any business under any name, title or description which is in the opinion 
of the Registrar calculated to deceive or to mislead the public or to cause annoyance or offence 
to any person or class of persons or is suggestive of blasphemy or indecency, to cease to carry 
on the business under than name, title or description.  
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shortcomings, the biggest of which is the failure to provide for the registration of 
business names. It is therefore wholly permissible for two entities to share the same 
business name. Not only can two different entities share a name, a business or 
individual can trade under a name that is not its registered name. It was stated in 
Two Sixty Four Investments (Pty) Ltd v Trust Bank,307 that '[A]n incorporated 
company may trade through the medium of... businesses, each with a separate trade 
name. I know of no rule of law which disentitles it from doing so.' 
In the absence of a registry of business names it is impossible to know who is who. It 
is therefore crucial to have some form of registration of business names. This will 
help prevent the duplication of business names, which could lead to fraud. It is 
therefore recommended that the Business Names Act be amended to make it 
compulsory for business names to be registered. An office of the Registrar of 
Business Names must be established and housed under the Registrar of 
Companies. This would ensure that there is coordination between the two offices 
and prevent the registration of business names that are similar to those of already 
registered companies. The converse would also apply: it would prevent the 
registration of companies with names similar to registered business names. 
It is suggested that the use of a trading name must be interrogated before an 
account is opened for a client using a trading name, i.e. the use of the trading name 
must be thoroughly explained by the user of the name and further verified by the 
bank.308 
As regards the identification of franchisees, the first port of call should be the 
franchisor. Guidance Note 3 must be amended to make it compulsory for a bank, 
when it is approached by a franchisee seeking to open a bank account, first to 
establish from the franchisor whether indeed the applicant for a bank account has 
                                                 
307 1993 (3) SA 384 (W) at 3851. 
308 Pretorius 2002 SA Merc LJ 106. See also the Energy Measurements case at 101 where it 
was held that the use of a trading name calls for some explanation. 
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been granted the authority by the franchisor to operate a franchise. The confirmation 
must be in writing. Only after the existence and validity of the franchise agreement is 
established should the bank account be opened, subject to the franchisor having 
gone through the other normal CDD processes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
BOOKS 
Boberg The Law of Delict 
Boberg PQR The Law of Delict Vol 1 (Juta and Company 1984) 
Brodkin Opening Accounts: A Bank’s Obligations and Rights 
 Brodkin MD Opening Accounts: A Bank’s Obligations and Rights (LLM 
dissertation Rand Afrikaans University 2002)  
De Koker South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law 
De Koker L South African Money Laundering and Terror Financing Law (Lexis 
Nexis Durban 2010) 
Dobson and Hufbauer World Capital Markets-Challenge to the G-10 
Dobson and Hufbauer World Capital Markets-Challenge to the G-10 (Institute 
for International Economics Washington DC 2001) 
Goodhart The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of The Early 
Years 
Goodhart C The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of The 
Early Years (Cambridge University Press Cambridge 2011) 
Hernandez-Coss, Isern and Porteous AML/CFT Regulation: Implications for 
Financial Service Providers that Serve Low Income People  
Hernandez-Coss R, Isern J and Porteous D AML/CFT Regulation: 
Implications for Financial Service Providers that Serve Low Income People 
(The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Washington DC 
2005) 
 91 
 
Hapgood Paget’s Law of Banking 
Hapgood M Paget’s Law of Banking 13th ed (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2007) 
Jones and Schoeman An Introduction to South African Banking and Credit Law 
Jones M and Schoeman H An Introduction to South African Banking and 
Credit Law 2nd ed (Lexis Nexis Butterworths 2006) 
Malan, Pretorius and du Toit Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques and Promissory 
Notes 
Malan FR, Pretorius JT and du Toit SF Malan on Bills of Exchange, Cheques 
and Promissory Notes 5th ed (Lexis Nexis Durban 2009) 
Norton and Walker Banks: Fraud and Crime 
Norton JJ and Walker G Banks: Fraud and Crime 2nd ed (Informa Law from 
Routledge New York 2013) 
Penn and Wadsley The Law Relating To Domestic Banking 
Penn GA and Wadsley J The Law Relating To Domestic Banking 2nd ed 
(Sweet & Maxwell London 2000) 
Stessens Money Laundering A New International Law Enforcement Model 
Stessens G Money Laundering A New International Law Enforcement Model 
(Cambridge University Press New York 2000) 
Thelesklaf Tracing Stolen Assets A Practitioner’s Handbook 
Thelesklaf D Tracing Stolen Assets A Practitioner’s Handbook (Basel Institute 
on Governance Basel 2009) 
Van Jaarsveld Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law 
 92 
 
Van Jaarsveld IL Aspects of Money Laundering in South African Law (LLD 
thesis University of South Africa 2011) 
Wood The Basel Committee and the Politics of Financial Globalisation 
Wood DR The Basel Committee and the Politics of Financial Globalisation 
(Ashgate Burlington 2004) 
JOURNAL ARTICLES 
Aiolfi and Pieth 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 359 
Aiolfi and Pieth “The private sector becomes active: the Wolfsburg process” 
2003 (10) Journal of Financial Crime 359-365 
Arora and Khanna 2009 International Journal of Business Science and Applied 
Management 1 
Arora B and Khanna A “A study to investigate the reasons for bank frauds and 
the implementation of preventive security controls in Indian banking industry” 
2009 (4) International Journal of Business Science and Applied Management 
1-21 
Cowen 1981 TSAR 193 
Cowen DV “The Liability of a Bank in the Computer Age in respect of a Stolen 
Cheque” 1981 TSAR 193-222 
Croall 2003 Journal of Financial Crime 45 
Croall H “Combating financial crime: regulatory versus crime control 
approaches” 2003 (11) Journal of Financial Crime 45-55 
De Koker 2004 J. S. Afr. L. 715 
 93 
 
De Koker L “Client identification and money laundering control: perspectives 
on the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001” 2004 (4) J. S. Afr. L. 715-
746 
De Koker 
 2006 Journal of Financial Crime 26 
De Koker L “Money laundering control and suppression of financing of 
terrorism” 2006 (13) Journal of Financial Crime 26-50 
Di Lorenzo 1986 American University Law Review 647 
Di Lorenzo V “Public confidence and the banking system: the policy basis for 
continued separation of commercial and investment banking” 1986 (35) 
American University Law Review 647-698 
Filotto and Masciandro 2001 Journal of Money Laundering Control 133 
Filotto U and Masciandro D “Money laundering regulation and bank 
compliance costs: What do your customers know? Economics and the Italian 
experience” 2001 (5) Journal of Money Laundering Control 133-145 
Gathii 2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 200-205 
Gathii JT “The Financial Action Task Force and Global Administrative Law” 
2010 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 197-209  
Kidd 1993 S. African L.J. 1 
Kidd M “Can a collecting banker be held liable under the Lex Aquilia - recent 
developments and some thoughts on the future” 1993 (110) S. African L.J. 1-8 
Kutubi 2011 World Journal of Social Sciences 36 
 94 
 
Kutubi SS “Combating money laundering by the financial institutions: an 
analysis of challenges and efforts in Bangladesh” 2011 (1) World Journal of 
Social Sciences 36-51 
Lawack 2013 Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 317 
Lawack VA “Mobile money, financial inclusion and financial integrity: the 
South African case” 2013 (8) Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts 
317-346 
Malan 1978 De Jure 326 
Malan FR `Professional responsibility and the payment and collection of 
cheques' De Jure (1978) 326-345 
Malan and Pretorius 1991 THRHR 705 
Malan FR and Pretorius JT `The collecting bank revisited' THRHR 54 (1991) 
705-716 
Malan and Pretorius 1994 SA Merc LJ 218 
Malan FR and Pretorius JT “Liability of the collecting bank: more clarity?” 
1994 (6) SA Merc LJ 218-226 
Maurer 2005 Cultural Anthropology 474 
Maurer B “Due diligence and ‘reasonable man,’ offshore” 2005 (10) Cultural 
Anthropology 474-504 
Moshi 2007 ISS 1 
Moshi PBH “Fighting money laundering: the challenges in Africa” 2007 ISS 
Paper 152 1-10 
Mthembu-Salter 2006 ISS Monograph Series 21 
 95 
 
Mthembu-Salter G “Money laundering challenges” ISS Monograph Series No 
124 2006 21-38 
Mulligan 1998 Fordham International Law Journal 2324 
Mulligan D “Know Your Customer regulations and the international banking 
system: towards a general self-regulatory regime” 1998 (22) Fordham 
International Law Journal 2324-2372 
Njotini 2010 Obiter 556 
Njotini MN “The transaction or activity monitoring process: an analysis of the 
customer due diligence systems of the United Kingdom and South Africa” 
2010 Obiter 556-573 
Pieth 1998 European Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 159 
Pieth M “Prevention of money laundering: a comparative analysis” 1998 (6) 
European Journal of Criminal Law & Criminal Justice 159-168 
Pretorius 2000 SA Merc LJ 359 
Pretorius JT “More guidelines on the negligence of the collecting bank” 2000 
(12) SA Merc LJ 359-368 
Sabol 1999 Loyola Consumer Law Review 165 
Sabol MA “The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998: do 
individuals finally get their day in court?” 1999 (11) Loyola Consumer Law 
Review 165-173 
Shepherd 2009 Journal of the Professional Lawyer 83 
Shepherd KL, “Guardians at the gate: the gatekeeper initiative and the risk-
based approach for transactional lawyers” 2009 (43) Journal of the 
Professional Lawyer 83-103 
 96 
 
Smit 2001 ISS Monograph 1 
Smit P “Clean Money, suspect source-turning organized crime against itself” 
2001 ISS Monograph 51 1-65 
Van der Linde 1995 Juta’s Bus. L 10 
Van der Linde K “The liability of a collecting bank for negligence” 1995 (3) 
Juta’s Bus. L 10-11 
Van Jaarsveld 2006 Obiter 228 
Van Jaarsveld IL “Mimicking Sisyphus? An evaluation of the Know Your 
Customer Policy” 2006 Obiter 228-244 
Van Jaarsveld 2001 SA Merc LJ 580 
Van Jaarsveld IL “The end of bank secrecy? Some thoughts on the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Bill” 2001 (13) SA Merc LJ 580-592 
Van Jaarsveld 2002 Juta’s Bus. L 200 
Van Jaarsveld IL “The Financial Intelligence Centre regulations” 2002 (10) 
Juta’s Bus. L 200-205 
INTERNET SOURCES 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Core principles for Effective Banking 
Supervision 2012” http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf (date of use: 12 July 2013) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Customer Due Diligence for Banks 2001” 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.pdf (date of use: 11 September 2012) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.htm (date 
of use: 12 July 2013) 
 97 
 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “General Guide to Account Opening and 
Customer Identification 2003” http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85annex.htm (date of use: 
20 May 2012) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision “Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking 
System for the Purpose of Money-Laundering (December 1988)” 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.pdf (date of use: 20 March 2012) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf (date 
of use: 8 October 2013) 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm (date 
of use: 11 October 2013) 
Bester H, De Koker L and Hawthorne R “Access to Financial Services in South 
Africa: A brief Case Study of the Effect of the Implementation of the Financial Action 
Task Force Recommendations” www.microfinancegateway.org (date of use: 5 
November 2012) 
Book Of Rules Bosnia and Herzegovina on Data, Information, Documents, 
Identification Methods and Minimum other Indicators Required for Efficient 
Implementation of Provisions of the Law on the Prevention of Money Laundering 
(2005) www.imolin.org (date of use: 28 July 2012) 
Brown H and Kerry J “The BCCI Affair: A Report to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations” www.fas.org/irp/congress/1992_rpt/bcci (date of use: 19 July 2013) 
FATF “Global Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Threat Assessment 2010” 
http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Global/threat/assessment.pdf                 
(date of use: 7 October 2013)   
FATF “The Forty Recommendations of the FATF (1990)” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/med 
ia/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdf/FATF%20Recommendantions%201990.pdf 
(date of use: 12 January 2013) 
 98 
 
FATF “Politically Exposed Persons in Relation to AML/CFT” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/  
media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-PEP-Rec12-22.pdf (date of use: 
5 November 2013) 
FATF “Public Statement” www.fatf-gafi.org (date of use: 28 July 2012) 
FATF “FATF Recommendations 2012” http://www.fatf-gafi.org//media/fatf/documents 
//pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf (date of use: 30 July 2015) 
FATF “FATF Forty Recommendations (2003)” http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/doc 
uments/FATF%Standards%20%2040%20Recommendations%20rc.pdf (date of use: 
10 November 2014) 
FATF http://www.fatf-gafi.org (date of use: 20 May 2012) 
Gathii JT http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam//migrated//pdf.gathii.authcheckda 
m.pdf (date of use: 11 October 2013) 
Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion http:www.gpfi.org (date of use: 20 August 
2013) 
International Monetary Fund www.imf.org/external/np/leg/amlcft/eng/aml2.html (date 
of use: 5 January 2013) 
International Organisation of Securities Commission http://www.iosco.org (date of 
use: 16 May 2012). 
Jackson JK “The Financial Action Task Force: An Overview” http://www.fas.org/sgp/c                    
rs/misc/RS21904.pdf (date of use: 11 October 2011)  
Mangels C http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Jeljour_results.cfm?nxtres=861&form (date of 
use: 19 October 2012) 
Money Laundering Red Flags www.ffiec.gov/bsa_aml_infobase/documents/Deposit 
Acct.pdf (date of use: 28 July 2012) 
 99 
 
Simmons B “International Effort against Money Laundering” http://scholar.harvard. 
edu.bsimmons/files/moneylaundering.pdf (date of use: 11 October 2013) 
Transparency International www.transparency.org (date of use: 5 February 2013) 
Wolfsberg “FAQs on ‘Politically Exposed Persons” http://www.wolfsberg principles. 
com/faq-persons.html (date of use: 15 September 2012)        
TABLE OF CASES 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 (3) SA 824 (A) 
Atkinson Oates Motors Ltd v Trust Bank of Africa Ltd 1977 (3) SA 188 (W) 
Columbus Joint Venture v Absa Bank Ltd 2002 (1) SA 90 (SCA) 
Energy Measurements (Pty) Ltd v First National Bank of SA Ltd 2001 (3) SA 132 (W)  
Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 (1) SA 783 (A) 
KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 (1) SA 377 (D)  
Leal and Co v Williams 1906 TS 554 
Lion Match Co Ltd v Wessels 1946 OPD 376 
Powell and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd t/a Volkskas Bank 1998 (2) SA 807 (SE) 
Rhostar (Pvt) Ltd v Netherlands Bank of Rhodesia Ltd 1972 (2) SA 703 (R)  
Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Standard Bank of SA Ltd 1928 WLD 223 
Zimbabwe Banking Corporation Ltd v Pyramid Motor Corporation (Pvt) Ltd 1985 (4) 
SA 553 (ZS) 
 100 
 
UNITED KINGDOM 
Ladbroke & Co v Todd [1914] LT 43 
Lloyds Bank Ltd v E.B Savory & Co [1933] AC 201 
Marfani & Co v Midland Bank Ltd [1968] 2 All E.R. 573 (CA) 
United Dominions Trust v Kirkwood [1966] 2 Q.B. 431 
TABLE OF LEGISLATION 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Banks Act 94 of 1990 
Business Names Act 27 of 1960 
Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 
Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act 
33 of 2004 
South African Law Commission Act 19 of 1973 
BILLS 
Financial Intelligence Bill of 2001 
Money Laundering Control Bill of 1996 
REGULATIONS AND PROCLAMATIONS 
 101 
 
SOUTH AFRICA 
Exemptions in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
General Guidance Note Concerning Identification of Clients in terms of the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001(Government Notice 534 Government Gazette 
26278)  
Government Notice 715 of 18 July 2005: Guidance for Banks on Customer 
Identification and Verification of Related Matters 
Proclamation R715 Government Gazette 27803 of 18 July 2005 
Proclamation No. 6 Government Gazette 23078 of 31 January 2002 
Proclamation No. 51Government Gazette 25151 of 27 June 2003 
Regulations in terms of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 
INTERNATIONAL DOCUMENTS 
Client Due Diligence for Banks (2001) (available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85.p 
df (date of use: 15 August 2012)) 
Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision (1999) (available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs30a.pdf (date of use: 19 August 2014)) 
General Guide to Account Opening and Client Identification (2003) (available at 
www.bis.org/publ/bcbs85annex.htm (date of use: 20 May 2012)) 
Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of Money 
Laundering (December 1988) (available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc137.htm 
(date of use: 10 June 2012)) 
United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances, 1988 
 102 
 
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, 2000 
OTHER ANTI MONEY LAUNDERING CONTRIBUTIONS 
South African Law Commission Discussion Paper 64, Project 104 “Money 
Laundering Control and Related Matters” (7 August 1996) 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Financial Intelligence Bill 2001 
